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SELF-EXECUTION AND TREATY DUALITY 
 Pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, the President has the power to make 
treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, and these treaties 
uncontroversially become binding on the United States as a matter of international law.  
The status of such treaties within the U.S. legal system is less clear.  The Supremacy 
Clause states that, along with the Constitution and laws of the United States, treaties 
made by the United States are part of the “supreme Law of the Land.”  At least since the 
Supreme Court’s 1829 decision in Foster v Neilson, however, it has been understood that 
treaty provisions are directly enforceable in U.S. courts only if they are “self-executing.”1
The legitimacy and implications of this self-execution requirement have generated 
substantial controversy and confusion among both courts and commentators. 
 Much of the debate over self-execution has been fought out, at least in part, on 
originalist territory, with competing claims about what the constitutional Founders would 
have understood.  Whatever one may think of the virtues of originalist methodology in 
general, it has not been successful in moving the self-execution debate forward.  Among 
other things, both treaty practice and the nation’s position in the world have changed so 
dramatically since the Founding that is difficult for originalism to compel contemporary 
conclusions.  It is noteworthy, for example, that most scholarship on self-execution 
hardly mentions the phenomenon of congressional-executive agreements (which are 
ratified by the President with the approval of a majority of both houses of Congress rather 
than two-thirds of the Senate), even though they constitute the vast majority of 
international agreements concluded by the United States since the 1930s.2  Similarly, the 
development in the modern era of legislative-style multilateral treaties, many of which 
overlap substantially with domestic legislation, poses issues not contemplated by the 
Founders.3
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2The Supreme Court’s decision last Term in Medellín v Texas contains the most 
extensive discussion of treaty self-execution in the Court’s history.4  In that case, the 
Court held that a treaty obligation of the United States to comply with a decision of the 
International Court of Justice (the international adjudicatory arm of the United Nations 
that sits in The Hague) was not self-executing and thus could not be applied by U.S. 
courts to override an otherwise valid state rule of criminal procedure.  The Court also 
held that the President lacked the unilateral authority to compel state courts to comply 
with the International Court’s decision.  The decision is both controversial and subject to 
differing interpretations and thus, if anything, is likely to intensity the debate. 
 My goal in this Article is to clear up some conceptual confusion relating to the 
self-execution doctrine and, in the process, better explain the contemporary practice of 
the courts and political branches relating to treaty enforcement.  To that end, I will make 
three claims about treaty self-execution.  First, the Supremacy Clause does not by itself 
tell us the extent to which treaties should be judicially enforceable.  Second, the relevant 
intent in discerning self-execution is the intent of the U.S. treatymakers (that is, the 
President and Senate), not the collective intent of the various parties to the treaty.  Third, 
even if treaties and statutes have an equivalent status in the U.S. legal system in the 
abstract, there are important structural and functional differences between them that are 
relevant to judicial enforceability. 
 As will be shown, these three claims are interconnected.  The central theme 
connecting them is that treaties have a dual nature, in that they operate both within the 
domain of international politics as well as within the domain of law.  In addition to 
having a certain status within international law, and potentially also within domestic law, 
every treaty is a contract that implicates the U.S. relationship with one or more other 
nations, and such a relationship inherently includes political as well as legal elements, 
such as considerations of reciprocity, reputation, and national interest.  This duality of 
treaties is in turn relevant, as I will explain, to their domestic judicial enforceability.5
The three claims set forth in this Article are also complementary, in that each of them is 
best understood along with the other two, and together they present a relatively coher
explanation for the judicial precedent in the area, including (despite its ambiguities) the 
Medellín decision, as well as the practices of the political branches. 
ent
 Part I of this Article briefly reviews the academic debates over treaty self-
execution, some of the uncertainties surrounding the issue, and what is at stake.  Part II 
defends and explains the implications of my first claim:  that the Supremacy Clause does 
4 See 128 S Ct 1346 (2008). 
5 There is a longstanding theoretical debate about how to conceive of the relationship between 
international law and domestic law, a debate that is sometimes framed as one between “monism” and 
“dualism.”  The term “dualism” in that debate refers to the view “that international and domestic law are 
distinct, each nation determines for itself when and to what extent international law is incorporated into its 
legal system, and the status of international law in the domestic system is determined by domestic law.”  
Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 Stan L Rev 
529, 530 (1999).  My use of the term “duality” in this Article is not intended to engage with that debate. 
3not by itself tell us the extent to which treaties should be judicially enforceable.  Part III 
defends the second claim:  that the relevant intent concerning self-execution is that of the 
U.S. treaty-makers.  Part IV defends the third claim:  that, even if statutes and treaties 
have equivalent legal status in the abstract, they are different in important ways that relate 
to judicial enforceability.  Finally, Part V explains how Medellín, despite its ambiguities, 
is generally consistent with these three claims.   
In staking out these claims, I will refer extensively to the work of Professor 
Carlos Vázquez, who has been the most prolific and sophisticated theorist about treaty 
self-execution and who recently published an important article on the topic in the 
Harvard Law Review.  Although this Article will focus primarily on points of 
disagreement between us, I should emphasize at the outset that there are many points 
relating to treaty self-execution on which we agree, and I have benefited greatly from his 
work on the subject. 
I. THE SELF-EXECUTION DEBATE
 As Professor Vázquez has usefully explained, there are a number of possible 
reasons why a U.S. court might decline to enforce a treaty that has gone through the 
Article II process.6  A treaty may call for a governmental action, such as the 
appropriation of money or the creation of criminal liability, that is thought to lie 
exclusively within the powers of the full Congress.  Some treaty cases, like some 
constitutional and statutory cases, may be nonjusticiable – for example, because of 
standing requirements or the political question doctrine.  Or the case may depend upon 
the recognition of a private right of action, and the court may conclude that the treaty 
does not itself confer such a right of action.  Finally, a court may conclude that a treaty 
was not intended to be judicially enforceable unless and until implemented by a political 
branch, usually Congress.  The Foster decision relied on this last proposition, and 
Professor Vázquez refers to this doctrine as “Foster-type non-self-execution.”7  It is this 
type of non-self-execution that is the focus of this Article. 
 Critics of Foster-type non-self-execution contend that it is at odds with, or at least 
in tension with, the Supremacy Clause, which states that “all” treaties made by the United 
States shall be the supreme law of the land.  Foster-type non-self-execution, the argument 
goes, means that only some treaties are given effect as supreme law of the land.8  In part 
because they view Foster-type non-self-execution as difficult to reconcile with the 
6 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am J Intl L 695 
(1995). 
7 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land:  The Supremacy Clause and the 
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv L Rev 599, 602 (2008). 
8 See Vázquez, 89 Am J Intl L at 706 (cited in note 6); Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 610 (cited in 
note 7); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am J Intl L 760, 760 (1988); see also Louis Henkin, 
Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 199 (2d ed 1996) (“[Chief Justice] Marshall [in Foster] . 
. . felt obligated to read an exception into the Supremacy Clause.”). 
4Supremacy Clause, critics contend that there should at least be a strong presumption in 
favor of treaty self-execution.  Professor Vázquez has argued, for example, that “the 
concept of a non-self-executing treaty is in tension with the Supremacy Clause’s 
designation of treaties as ‘law’,” and that, as a result, “our Constitution should be read to 
establish a presumption that treaties are self-executing.”9
 The most prominent counterpoint to this view has come from Professor John Yoo.
In a lengthy article published in the Columbia Law Review, Yoo argued that the original 
understanding of the constitutional Founders was that treaties would not operate as 
domestic law when they (as is often the case today) addressed matters falling within the 
scope of Congress’s legislative authority.10  In a subsequent article, Yoo argued that 
requiring legislative implementation for many treaties is also supported by constitutional 
text and structure.11  As an alternative to his constitutional claim, Yoo contended that 
there should at least be a presumption against treaty self-execution, such that the 
treatymakers would be required to issue a “clear statement” if they wanted a treaty to be 
self-executing.12
 At least before Medellín, it was unclear to what extent the case law supported one 
view or the other, although it seems fair to say that it did not implement what Professor 
Yoo claimed was the original understanding (as he essentially conceded).  Courts have 
often enforced treaties directly without consideration of whether the treaties addressed 
matters falling within Congress’s legislative authority.13  In particular, as noted in the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, “[p]rovisions in treaties of friendship, 
commerce, and navigation, or other agreements conferring rights on foreign nationals, 
especially in matters ordinarily governed by State law, have been given effect without 
any implementing legislation, their self-executing character assumed without 
discussion.”14  On the other hand, lower courts in recent years have often been reluctant 
to allow private judicial enforcement of treaties, especially multilateral treaties, so much 
9 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 Colum L Rev 2154, 2157, 2173 (1999). 
10 See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution:  Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
Original Understanding, 99 Colum L Rev 1955 (1999).   
11 See John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking:  A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-
Self-Execution, 99 Colum L Rev 2218 (1999). 
12 Id at 2255.  For critical responses to Yoo’s articles, see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?:  
Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 Colum L 
Rev 2095 (1999), and Vázquez, 99 Colum L Rev (cited in note 9). 
13 See, e.g., Kolovrat v Oregon, 366 US 187 (1961) (applying treaty with Serbia to allow 
Yugoslavian nationals to inherit personal property from Oregon decedent); Asakura v City of Seattle, 265 
US 332 (1924) (applying treaty with Japan to preempt Seattle ordinance that disallowed non-citizens from 
being licensed as pawnbrokers); Ware v Hylton, 3 US 199 (1796) (applying treaty with Great Britain to 
preempt Virginia statute that restricted ability of British creditors to recover on pre-Revolutionary War 
debts). 
14 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 111, reporters’ note 5 
(1987). 
5so that it is arguable that the modern case law suggests a presumption against self-
execution.15
 Modern lower court decisions have also highlighted a number of uncertainties 
surrounding the self-execution doctrine.  One uncertainty concerns the relevant intent that 
courts should look to in discerning self-execution.  If self-execution is like the substantive 
terms in the treaty, then, as with a domestic contract, a court should attempt to discern the 
collective intent of the parties.16  Some courts have in fact suggested that, albeit without 
much analysis.17  The Restatement, by contrast, takes the position that the relevant intent 
is that of the U.S. treatymakers – that is, the Senate and President18 – and courts have in 
fact given particular weight to evidence of U.S. intent.19
 Another, somewhat related uncertainty concerns the materials that courts should 
look at in discerning the relevant intent.  The Court in Foster emphasized the treaty text, 
but it is not clear when treaty text will be deemed to suggest self-execution or non-self-
execution.  There have also been questions about the extent to which it is proper for 
courts to take account of non-textual materials, such as drafting or ratification history.  In 
the 1970s and 1980s, some lower courts developed multi-factored tests for self-execution.  
These factors included the following considerations: 
“(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations 
imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of alternative 
enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right 
of action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.”20
15 See, e.g., United States v Emuegbunam, 268 F3d 377, 389 (6th Cir 2001) (“As a general rule, 
however, international treaties do not create rights that are privately enforceable in the federal courts.”); 
United States v Li, 206 F3d 56, 60 (1st Cir 2000) (en banc) (“[T]reaties do not generally create rights that 
are privately enforceable in the federal courts.”); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v United States, 967 F2d 965, 
968 (5th Cir 1992) (“International treaties are not presumed to create rights that are privately 
enforceable.”). 
16 See, e.g., Air France v Saks, 470 US 392, 399 (1985) (noting that, when interpreting the 
meaning of a treaty, U.S. courts attempt “to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with 
the shared expectations of the contracting parties”); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v United 
States District Court, 482 US 522, 533 (1987) (“In interpreting an international treaty, we are mindful that 
it is ‘in the nature of a contract between nations,’ to which ‘general rules of construction apply.’”). 
17 See cases cited in note 66. 
18 See text accompanying note 68. 
19 See David H. Moore, An Emerging Uniformity for International Law, 75 Geo Wash L Rev 1, 
12-14 (2006); Vázquez, 89 Am J Intl L at 705 n.47 (cited in note 6).
20 Frolova v Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F2d 370, 373 (7th Cir 1985); see also, e.g., 
United States v Postal, 589 F2d 862, 877 (5th Cir 1979). 
6Some courts also have suggested that deference should be given to the views of the 
Executive Branch, at the time of the litigation, with respect to whether a treaty is self-
executing.21
 Courts have also had to address the effect of “non-self-execution declarations” 
attached by the Senate to its advice and consent to some treaties.  Since early in U.S. 
history, the Senate has had a practice of qualifying its consent to certain treaties through 
the adoption of reservations and other limitations.22  Starting in the 1970s, with the 
support of the Executive Branch, the Senate began considering the adoption of “non-self-
execution declarations” in connection with its consent to the ratification of human rights 
treaties, and it began adopting these declarations in the early 1990s.  These declarations 
have been voted on by the Senate as part of its resolution of advice and consent to the 
treaties, and have been typically included in the U.S. instrument of ratification that is 
communicated to the other treaty parties.  Before Medellín, the Senate had utilized these 
formal non-self-execution declarations in connection with a few treaties outside the 
human rights area as well, but such declarations were uncommon.  For most treaties, the 
Senate and Executive Branch either did not express a view about self-execution, or they 
expressed a view in less formal ratification materials, such as the President’s letter of 
transmittal to the Senate or the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
 As Professor Jack Goldsmith and I have explained, the U.S. treatymakers have 
articulated a number of reasons for using the formal non-self-execution declarations in 
the human rights area: 
“First, they believe that, taking into account the substantive reservations 
and interpretive conditions, U.S. domestic laws and remedies are sufficient 
to meet U.S. obligations under human rights treaties.  There is thus no 
additional need, in their view, for domestic implementation.  Second, there 
is concern that the treaty terms, although similar in substance to U.S. law, 
are not identical in wording and thus might have a destabilizing effect on 
domestic rights protections if considered self-executing.  Third, there is 
disagreement about which treaty terms, if any, would be self-executing. 
The declaration is intended to provide certainty about this issue in advance 
of litigation.  Finally, the treatymakers believe that if there is to be a 
change in the scope of domestic rights protections, it should be done by 
legislation with the participation of the House of Representatives.”23
21 See, e.g., More v Intelcom Support Services, Inc., 960 F2d 466, 472 (5th Cir 1992). 
22 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent,
149 U Pa L Rev 399, 400-02 (2000). 
23 Id at 419-20. 
7Although courts consistently have treated these declarations as dispositive of the issue of 
self-execution,24 some commentators have questioned their validity, arguing, among 
other things, that they are at odds with the Supremacy Clause.25
 An important recent addition to the literature on self-execution came from 
Professor Tim Wu.26  Professor Wu analyzed the patterns of judicial enforcement of 
treaties throughout U.S. history and found that courts had consistently enforced treaties in 
cases involving state breaches of treaty obligations, but that, as a result of institutional 
deference, they often had not enforced treaties when they perceived that doing so would 
conflict with the wishes of Congress or, at least in some instances, the Executive Branch.
Professor Wu further concluded that, as his institutional deference explanation would 
predict, the role for direct judicial enforcement of treaties has been eroded by the 
twentieth-century rise of congressional-executive agreements, since, he argued, these 
agreements shift implementation authority from the courts to Congress.
 Not surprisingly, the Court’s decision in Medellín is spurring a new round of 
debate over treaty self-execution.27  In a recent article in the Harvard Law Review,
Professor Vázquez further develops arguments from his past writings on the subject.28
He contends that, as a result of the Supremacy Clause, there should be a “requirement of 
equivalent treatment” – that is, that “treaties are presumptively enforceable in court in the 
same circumstances as constitutional and statutory provisions of like content.”29  In 
addition, while he accepts that Foster-type non-self-execution can be an exception to this 
requirement, he contends that there should be a presumption in favor of self-execution 
“that can be overcome only through a clear statement that the obligations in a particular 
treaty are subject to legislative implementation.”30
 The Senate has also adjusted its practices after Medellín, and its adjustments are 
raising new questions.  The Senate is expressing its views about self-execution more 
frequently than in the past, and it is more consistently doing so in its formal resolution of 
24 See, e.g., Renkel v United States, 456 F3d 640, 644 (6th Cir 2006) (collecting cases); Auguste v 
Ridge, 395 F3d 123, 141 n.17 (3d Cir 2005) (same). 
25 See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 Gw J Intl L & Econ 49, 64 (1997); John Quigley, The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DePaul L Rev 1287, 
1302-04 (1993); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties:  Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 UC 
Davis L Rev 1, 46-55 (2002); cf. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, at 202 (cited 
in note 8) (arguing that the practice of non-self-execution declarations “is ‘anti-Constitutional’ in spirit and 
highly problematic as a matter of law”). 
26 See Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 Va L Rev 571 (2007). 
27 For an online debate that occurred shortly after the decision, see Federalist Society Online 
Debate, Medellín v. Texas, Part I: Self-Execution (March 28, 2008) (featuring Ted Cruz, David Sloss, Nick 
Rosenkranz, and Edwin Williamson), at http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.17/default.asp.
28 See Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev 599 (cited in note 7). 
29 Id at 602. 
30 Id. 
8advice and consent rather than in less formal ratification materials.31  At the same time, 
the Senate has not been recommending that these formal declarations be included with 
the U.S. instrument of ratification that is communicated to the other treaty parties.32
Finally, the Senate has for the first time been attaching self-execution as well as non-self-
execution declarations to its advice and consent to some treaties,33 and there is some 
question about whether those new declarations are constitutionally valid.34
 There are a number of issues at stake in the self-execution debate.  As suggested 
above, one issue concerns the validity of non-self-execution and self-execution 
declarations attached by the Senate to its advice and consent to some treaties.  To the 
extent that these declarations are valid and binding, their increased use will simplify the 
self-execution question going forward.  The United States is already a party to thousands 
of treaties, however, that lack such Senate declarations.  It seems likely after Medellín
that treaties that fall within established lines of self-execution precedent, such as bilateral 
treaties granting aliens property or business rights, will continue to be treated as self-
executing.  It is uncertain, however, to what extent treaties not covered by existing lines 
of precedent, and which lack Senate declarations, will be viewed as judicially 
enforceable.  One example is the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which gives 
arrested foreign nationals the right to have their consulate notified of their arrest and to 
communicate with their consulate.35  As will be discussed, this treaty provision lies at the 
backdrop of the Medellín case, although the Supreme Court reserved judgment on 
whether it was self-executing.  The Geneva Conventions governing the treatment of 
classes of individuals during wartime are another example, as detainees in the war on 
terrorism have sought to invoke them to challenge their detention, treatment, and trial.36
Whether these and other treaties will be found to be self-executing will be affected by 
whatever presumption (if any) that courts apply with respect to self-execution and by the 
types of materials that courts consider in making the determination. 
31 See, e.g., Exec Rept 110-12, 110th Cong, 2d Sess, Extradition Treaties with the European 
Union, at 9 (Sept. 11, 2008) (“Such a statement, while generally included in the documents associated with 
treaties submitted to the Senate by the executive branch and in committee reports, has not generally been 
included in Resolutions of advice and consent.”), at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&docid=f:er012.110.pdf. 
32 See, e.g., Exec Rept 110-19, 110th Cong, 2d Sess, International Convention on the Control of 
Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, at 9-10 (Sept. 11, 2008) (indicating that a declaration of non-self-
execution, unlike a different declaration included in the resolution of advice and consent, would not be 
included in the instrument of ratification), at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110 _cong_reports&docid=f:er019.pdf. 
33 See 154 Cong Rec S9328-S9332 (Sept. 23, 2008) (senatorial advice and consent for various 
mutual legal assistance, extradition, and tax treaties, containing a declaration for each one stating that, 
“This Treaty is self-executing.”). 
34 See, e.g., Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 685-94 (cited in note 7) (doubting the constitutional 
validity of self-execution declarations). 
35 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36. 
36 See, e.g., Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 415 F3d 33, 38-40 (DC Cir 2005) (concluding that the Third 
Geneva Convention was not judicially enforceable), reversed on other grounds, 548 US 557 (2006). 
9II. SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND
 In this Part, I stake out my first claim:  the Supremacy Clause does not by itself 
tell us the extent to which treaties should be judicially enforceable.  The Supremacy 
Clause states that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”  Critics of non-self-execution 
emphasize the word “all” and suggest that non-self-execution is problematic because it 
means that not all treaties are judicially enforceable.  In making this argument, critics 
incorrectly equate supreme law of the land with automatic judicial enforceability. 
 A brief consideration of the other forms of supreme federal law – federal statutes 
and the Constitution – shows that judicial enforceability is not a prerequisite for status as 
supreme law of the land.  Suits by citizens who are not concretely injured by government 
law-breaking cannot bring suit, even if it means that no one can ever bring the suit.37
Certain constitutional questions are considered nonjusticiable political questions.38
Congress can sometimes deprive the courts of jurisdiction to hear federal statutory 
claims, such as statutory claims relating to discretionary agency action.39  States have 
broad immunity from suit on federal law claims, even though they are obligated to 
comply with federal law.40  Conditional spending provisions and statutory delegations of 
discretionary authority to the Executive are also often not judicially enforceable.41  In all 
of these and similar situations we do not think that there is any violation of, or even 
tension with, the Supremacy Clause. 
 Even when a statute is subject to some judicial review, Congress often 
uncontroversially regulates the extent and nature of that review, further suggesting that 
the Supremacy Clause does not deprive the national political branches of flexibility over 
this issue.  Thus, for example, even though the Supremacy Clause makes statutes 
supreme over state law, Congress sometimes enacts statutes that expressly do not 
preempt state law.42  Moreover, it is not uncommon for Congress to limit standing to sue 
37 See, e.g., United States v Richardson, 418 US 166, 179 (1974) (“[T]he absence of any particular 
individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is 
committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.”). 
38 See, e.g., Nixon v United States, 506 US 224 (1993). 
39 See, e.g., Webster v Doe, 486 US 592 (1988). 
40 See, e.g., Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44 
(1996). 
41 See, e.g., Gonzaga University v Doe, 536 US 273 (2002) (disallowing private enforcement of 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act); Dept of the Navy v Egan, 484 US 518, 526-30 (1988) 
(disallowing review of denial of security clearance). 
42 See, e.g., 15 USC § 7707(b)(2) (stating that statute relating to electronic mail “shall not be 
construed to preempt” certain state laws); 18 USC § 896 (stating that statute relating to extortionate credit 
transactions “does not preempt any field of law with respect to which State legislation would be 
permissible in the absence of this [statute]”). 
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or to expressly or implicitly preclude private rights of action.43  It is also widely accepted 
that Congress can limit the domestic enforceability of congressional-executive 
agreements, which constitute the vast majority of the international agreements concluded 
by the United States in the modern era (and which constitute binding “treaties” under 
international law).44
 Statutes delegating implementation authority to the Executive provide a 
particularly close analogy to non-self-executing treaties. Consider, for example, the 
statute at issue in the famous foreign affairs case, United States v Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp.45  The statute there authorized President Franklin Roosevelt to criminalize the sale 
of arms to two countries involved in a conflict in Latin America if he found that such 
criminalization “may contribute to the reestablishment of peace between those countries.”  
Before Roosevelt implemented this statute, it would not have been judicially enforceable, 
and yet it still would have been part of the “Laws of the United States” referenced in the 
Supremacy Clause.  In a treaty, the Senate and President might similarly delegate 
domestic implementation discretion to non-judicial actors – that is, either to Congress or 
the Executive Branch.  Many statutory provisions are like this, and no one thinks that the 
Supremacy Clause requires that these provisions create self-executing rules of decision 
for the judiciary. 
 Ironically, supporters of broad treaty enforcement should be the last ones to tie 
law status to judicial review.  Judicial review is often unavailable on the international 
plane to enforce treaty and other legal obligations.  That fact, along with the frequent 
absence of other formal enforcement machinery, has sometimes led people to question 
whether international law is really “law.”  The prevailing view among international law 
scholars, however, is that international law can meaningfully be described as law despite 
the frequent absence of formal enforcement mechanisms, including the absence of 
judicial review.46  Supporters of a broad approach to treaty self-execution are particularly 
likely to hold this view about international law.  Yet if international law can be law on the 
international plane without judicial enforceability, why is that not also true on the 
domestic plane? 
43 See, e.g., 6 USC § 134 (stating, in information infrastructure statute, that “[n]othing in this part 
may be construed to create a private right of action for enforcement of any provision of this chapter”); 12 
USC § 1831g(d) (stating, in banking statute, that “[t]his section may not be construed as creating any 
private right of action”).  See also Paul B. Stephan, Private Remedies for Treaty Violations After Sanchez-
Llamas, 11 Lewis & Clark L Rev 65 (2007). 
44 For example, Congress restricted the domestic judicial enforceability of the GATT and NAFTA 
trade agreements.  See 19 USC § 3512; 19 USC § 3312.  For acceptance of this congressional authority, 
see, e.g., Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, at 217 (cited in note 8); Lori Fisler 
Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” 
Treaties, 67 Chi-Kent L Rev 515, 525-26 (1991); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope 
of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 Chi-Kent L Rev 571, 641 
(1991). 
45 299 US 304 (1938).  
46 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990); Louis Henkin, 
How Nations Behave (2d ed 1979); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 
Yale LJ 2599 (1997). 
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Of course, there is a relationship between a law’s status as supreme law of the 
land and judicial enforceability, a relationship highlighted by the statement in the 
Supremacy Clause that state judges shall be bound by the supreme law of the land, 
“anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”  The 
supreme law of the land takes precedence over conflicting state law, and one method of 
enforcing that supremacy is through the courts.  But this relationship is not a necessary 
one.  If in concluding the treaty the Senate and President have validly precluded judicial 
enforcement (an issue addressed in the next Part), then the state judges clause does not 
come into play.  The inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause simply, but very 
importantly, allows the U.S. treatymakers to preempt state law if they want to, without the 
possibility that state legislatures or judges will nullify the preemption. 
 The argument for more mandatory judicial review of treaty obligations depends 
on a separation of powers-oriented, rather than federalism-oriented, construction of the 
Clause.  Critics of non-self-execution argue that treaties were included in the Supremacy 
Clause to help avert U.S. treaty violations, something that they contend will be more 
likely to occur without self-execution.47  As an initial matter, it is important to remember 
that U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations generally does not depend on self-
execution.  There are many ways for a nation to comply with a treaty without direct 
judicial application, including preexisting legislation, new legislation, and executive 
action, and U.S. compliance with most treaties is not in fact accomplished through its 
courts.  As discussed below in Part III, treaties are never self-executing in some 
countries, and yet those countries generally manage to comply.  Critics of political branch 
flexibility with respect to the issue of self-execution also neglect to consider the ex ante 
effects of eliminating such flexibility.  Among other things, if the political branches could 
not regulate the domestic effects of treaties, they would likely enter into fewer, and less 
significant, treaty commitments.48
 In any event, the “compliance” description of the Supremacy Clause is potentially 
misleading because it neglects to mention the breaching parties that the Founders were 
worried about – the states.  Almost everyone agrees that the inclusion of treaties in the 
Supremacy Clause was a response to a specific problem under the Articles of 
Confederation, which is that it did not give the national government sufficient authority 
to ensure state compliance with treaty obligations.  This was particularly an issue with 
respect to the 1783 peace treaty with Great Britain, which had a provision requiring that 
British creditors be allowed to collect on pre-Revolutionary War debts.  Because some 
47 See, e.g., Sloss, 36 UC Davis L Rev at 16 (cited in note 25) (“The Framers included treaties in 
the Supremacy Clause to help promote U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations.”); Vázquez, 89 Am J 
Intl L at 706 (cited in note 6) (contending that treaties were included in the Supremacy Clause “to avert 
conflicts with other nations that could be expected to result from violations of treaties attributable to the 
United States”); Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 675 (cited in note 7) (“It was to avoid such friction that the 
Constitution gave treaties the force of domestic law and instructed judges to give them effect.”). 
48 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, 149 U Pa L Rev at 410-16 (documenting how non-self-
execution declarations and other conditions helped break the logjam that had prevented U.S. ratification of 
human rights treaties). 
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states had enacted laws preventing compliance with that provision, the British refused to 
comply with a provision in the treaty obligating them to vacate military forts in the 
northwest.  The Continental Congress took the position that the treaty was “part of the 
law of the land” binding on the states,49 but this was not expressly stated in the Articles 
of Confederation.  Perhaps because of this, the Continental Congress simply proceeded t
request that the states repeal any laws inconsistent with the peace treaty, which generated 
compliance from some but not all of the states. 
o
 During the Constitutional Convention, the “Virginia Plan” would have addressed 
the problem of state noncompliance with federal law by giving the national legislature the 
power to “negative” state laws, an idea particularly championed by James Madison.  The 
proposed negative approach was ultimately rejected at the Convention, in part because it 
was thought to invade too much on state sovereignty.  Instead, the Convention adopted 
the Supremacy Clause, a version of which was originally set forth in the “New Jersey 
Plan.”  As originally proposed, the Supremacy Clause stated that treaties and other 
federal laws would be “supreme law of the respective States.”50  As submitted to the 
Committee of Style near the end of the Convention, the Clause still referred to the 
“supreme law of the several States.”51  The Committee changed the wording of the 
Clause, without explanation, to the “supreme Law of the Land.”52
 Madison maintained throughout the Convention that the Supremacy Clause 
approach was inadequate to ensure against state violations of federal law, including 
treaties.53  In defending the Constitution in The Federalist Papers, however, he argued 
that including treaties in the Supremacy Clause should be considered unobjectionable 
given that the Continental Congress could already “make treaties which they themselves 
have declared and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the 
land.”54  As Madison’s implicit reference to the British peace treaty experience suggests, 
the Federalist defense of the Supremacy Clause was framed in terms of the relationship 
between the national government and the states.  For example, Hamilton complained in 
Federalist No. 22 that, under the Articles of Confederation, treaties were “liable to the 
infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of final 
jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those legislatures,” with the result that “[t]he 
faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of 
the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is 
49 See 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 124 (March 21, 1787); see also 32 Journals of the 
Continental Congress 177 (April 13, 1787). 
50 I The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 245 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
51 II The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 572 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
52 See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, The Supremacy Clause:  A Reference Guide to the 
United States Constitution (2004). 
53 See, e.g., I The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 316 (cited in 50) (expressing 
concern that the New Jersey Plan would not sufficiently prevent individual states from imposing on the 
whole country a “rupture with other powers”). 
54 Federalist No. 38, in The Federalist Papers 238 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). 
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composed.”55  The state ratification debates, as Professor Julian Ku has observed, 
similarly “focused on what we would recognize today as the federalism question,” and 
they “appear[ed] to confirm that the new Constitution was intended to prevent the state 
violations of treaties that had occurred during the Articles period.”56
 These materials suggest that the Founders did not want U.S. compliance with 
treaties to be dependent on state law.  The Founders understandably concluded that, 
unless it was clear that treaties took precedence over state law, an individual state could 
enact laws that would impose harmful externalities on the entire nation, and the national 
government would be powerless to prevent it.  As Justice Chase would later explain in a 
decision applying the British peace treaty to preempt a Virginia statute, “[a] treaty cannot 
be the supreme law of the land, that is of all the United States, if any act of a state 
legislature can stand in its way.”57  The Founders might have assumed as well that the 
usual mechanism for ensuring state compliance with treaties would be judicial review, 
although Professor Yoo has contested this proposition. 
 Nothing in this history, however, suggests that treaties were included in the 
Supremacy Clause in order to empower the courts to deter or redress national
government breaches of treaties, or in any other way limit the national political branches’ 
control over treaty compliance.  Indeed, the entire thrust of the adoption of the 
Supremacy Clause was one of empowering the national government to operate more 
effectively.  As Professor Christopher Drahozal notes in his book on the Supremacy 
Clause:
“Certainly the Supremacy Clause does away with the question under the 
Articles of Confederation of whether states have to implement treaties 
before they take effect.  That possibility, the subject of debate and federal 
action in connection with the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, is 
conclusively rejected by the Supremacy Clause.  Beyond that, however, 
the resolution of the self-execution debate is less clear, at least with 
respect to the preemption of state law.”58
55 Federalist No. 22, in The Federalist Papers at 151 (cited in note 54).  
56 Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws:  A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal 
Statutes, 80 Ind LJ 319, 377 (2005). 
57 Ware v Hylton, 3 US (3 Dall) 199, 236 (1796) (Chase, J); see also, e.g., Alona E. Evans, Self-
Executing Treaties in the United States of America, 30 Brit YB Intl L 178, 180-81 (1953) (“Experience 
under the Articles of Confederation lent support to the decision of the Constitutional Convention that, in a 
federal system, the conclusion of treaties must necessarily be within the exclusive competence of the 
Central government and that treaties must take precedence over the constitutions and laws of the several 
States.”).
58 Drahozal, The Supremacy Clause:  A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution at 160 
(cited in note 52).  John Jay, a particularly strong supporter of international law among the Founders, 
denied in Federalist No. 64 that treaties should be “repealable at pleasure” by the United States, but he was 
probably speaking there about the international plane rather than domestic plane, and in fact he remarked 
that “[t]he proposed Constitution . . . has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties.”  Federalist 
No. 64, in The Federalist Papers at 394 (cited in note 54); see also Ku, 80 Ind LJ at 378 (cited in note 56) 
(“Jay’s claim that treaties could never be cancelled without agreement by the other treaty party reveals that 
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To put it differently, there is no reason to think that the Supremacy Clause removes the 
international political dimension of treaties, which leaves to national governments the 
ultimate responsibility for deciding whether and how to comply with treaty obligations, 
and for accepting whatever international consequences may flow from that decision.  The 
Supremacy Clause simply ensures that in the United States this responsibility rests at the 
federal rather than state level. 
 The federalism orientation of the Supremacy Clause is further reflected in the fact 
that it refers only to state judges and state laws and does not mention the federal political 
branches.  The Constitution addresses the Executive Branch’s obligation to comply with 
federal law not in the Supremacy Clause but rather in the Take Care Clause of Article 
II.59  As for Congress, it is well settled that Congress has the authority to override both 
treaties and statutes, despite their status as supreme law of the land.60  Congress does of 
course have an obligation to comply with the Constitution, but the Supreme Court in 
Marbury described this obligation as emanating principally from the nature of a written 
constitution that assigns limited and enumerated powers to the national government 
rather than from the Supremacy Clause.61  The pattern of judicial enforcement of treaties 
throughout U.S. history also comports with a federalism rather than separation-of-powers 
understanding of the Supremacy Clause.  As Professor Wu has found, most judicial 
enforcement of treaties has been directed at states and localities, and, even outside that 
context, courts have tended to “look for signals from Congress or the Executive that 
might show who is meant to be responsible for enforcing a given treaty.”62
 Once the concept of supreme law of the land is viewed as potentially separate 
from automatic judicial enforceability, it is easier to understand contemporary judicial 
and political branch practice relating to treaties.  Consider, for example, the non-self-
execution declarations that the Senate and President sometimes include with their consent 
to treaties.  These declarations are not an effort to turn off the Supremacy Clause, as some 
critics contend.  They are simply an effort by the U.S. treatymakers to regulate the 
separable issue of judicial enforceability.  I will say more about these declarations in the 
next Part, and I will address there other constitutional objections that might be raised 
he was probably analyzing treaties in their international character without taking into account the 
complications of how to carry out treaties under municipal law.”). 
59 See US Const art II, § 3 (stating that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”). 
60 Congress obviously has the ability to override earlier congressional enactments.  As for 
overriding earlier treaties, see, for example, Whitney v Robertson, 124 US 190, 195 (1888) (reasoning that 
Congress can override a treaty and explaining that “[t]he duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to 
the latest expression of the sovereign will”). 
61 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803).  The Court did note at the end of its 
opinion, however, that it was not “entirely unworthy of observation” that the Constitution is listed before 
the “Laws of the United States” in the Supremacy Clause and that the phrase “Laws of the United States” in 
that Clause is qualified by the requirement that they be “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.  See id at 
180.  
62 Wu, 93 Va L Rev at 595 (cited in note 26). 
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against them.  For now, it is important to note that, in order to conclude that they violate 
the Supremacy Clause, one would need to read that Clause as not only mandating direct 
judicial enforceability, but doing so even when the Senate and President expressly do not 
desire judicial enforceability, and even when they have concluded that other U.S. laws 
already place the United States in compliance with the treaty.  Again, there is nothing in 
the history of the Supremacy Clause that suggests such a mandate. 
More generally, if there is no inherent conflict between non-self-execution and the 
Supremacy Clause, it is more difficult to justify a general presumption in favor of self-
execution, at least one premised on the purported policies of that Clause.  Critics of non-
self-execution typically describe the non-self-execution doctrine announced in Foster v 
Neilson as a problematic deviation from the Supremacy Clause.  Although most critics 
are willing to accept that Foster has precedential force, they argue that its scope should 
be kept to a minimum given what the critics describe as its constitutionally dubious 
origins.  Professor Vázquez contends, for example, that although “it is too late to reject 
Foster-type non-self-execution entirely[,] . . . Foster is reconcilable with the 
constitutional text only if accompanied by a strong presumption of self-execution.”63
But if non-self-execution is not in fact at odds with the Supremacy Clause, then at least 
this argument for a presumption in favor of self-execution loses force. 
III. RELEVANT INTENT
My second claim is that, in discerning whether a treaty is self-executing, the 
relevant intent is that of the U.S. treatymakers (i.e., the Senate and President), not the 
collective intent of the treaty parties.  As I will explain, my claim does not depend on any 
particular view about the relevance of ratification history or other non-textual materials in 
the self-execution analysis.  Indeed, my claim is compatible even with a pure “public 
meaning” approach to interpretation.64
 As Professor Vázquez has noted, “Courts and commentators seem to agree that a 
treaty’s self-executing character is largely, if not entirely, a matter of intent.”65  There has 
been substantial uncertainty, however, over whose intent counts – the collective intent of 
the parties to the treaty, or just the intent of the U.S. Senate and President.  Before 
Medellín, some lower courts had suggested, without analysis, that the collective intent of 
63 Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 610, 643 (cited in note 7). 
64 If it were appropriate to apply a public meaning approach to the issue of self-execution rather 
than an approach focused on intent, my claim would be that it should be the U.S. public meaning, not the 
international public meaning, that should be controlling, and that the materials relevant to the public 
meaning would include the declarations included by the Senate in its resolution of advice and consent.  I do 
not explore here the precise implications of such an approach, since courts and scholars have to date framed 
the self-execution issue as one of intent, and that is how the issue is described in Medellín.
65 Vázquez, 89 Am J Intl L at 704 (cited in note 6).  See also, e.g., Edwin D. Dickinson, Are the 
Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20 Am J Intl L 444, 449 (1926).   
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the parties is what matters,66 and this is also the view of some commentators.67  By 
contrast, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law reasons that the intent of the 
U.S. treatymakers should be dispositive.  As the Restatement explains: 
“In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the United States 
to decide how it will carry out its international obligations.  Accordingly, 
the intention of the United States determines whether an agreement is to 
be self-executing in the United States or should await implementation by 
legislation or appropriate executive or administrative action.”68
 Although I do not always agree with the Restatement’s claims, on this issue the 
Restatement is persuasive.  Nations have widely varying approaches to the domestic 
status of treaties, with some nations (such as Great Britain) always requiring legislative 
implementation before treaties can be enforced by domestic courts, other nations 
allowing most or all treaties to be enforced directly by their courts, and still other nations 
allowing only some treaties to be enforced in this way.69  Furthermore, international law 
generally does not concern itself with the particular institutions a nation uses to 
implement international obligations; nations are simply required to comply with their 
treaty obligations, and it does not matter whether they do so through their courts or 
through some other mechanism.  As a leading international law casebook notes, 
“International law requires a state to carry out its international obligations but, in general, 
how a state accomplishes that result is not of concern to international law or to the state 
system.”70  For these reasons, nations almost never negotiate about treaty self-execution, 
especially for multilateral treaties.  Moreover, parties negotiating a treaty are typically 
indifferent to the issue, so even tools used for contract gap filling would not work here.
66 See, e.g., United States v Postal, 589 F2d 862, 876 (5th Cir 1979) (“The question whether a 
treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpretation for the courts when the issue presents itself in litigation, 
. . . and, as in the case of all matters of interpretation, the courts attempt to discern the intent of the parties 
to the agreement so as to carry out their manifest purpose.”); Diggs v Richardson, 555 F2d 848, 851 (DC 
Cir 1976) (“In determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the signatory 
parties as manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain, recourse must 
be had to the circumstances surrounding its execution.”). 
67 See, e.g., Riesenfeld & Abbott, 67 Chi.-Kent L Rev at 608-09 (cited in note 44); Vázquez, 122 
Harv L Rev at 638-41 (cited in note 7).  The Supreme Court’s 1833 decision in United States v Percheman,
discussed in Part IV, also could be read to suggest an intent-of-the-parties approach, since the Court there 
looked to a foreign language version of the treaty in discerning self-execution.  See text accompanying note 
104. 
68 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 111, cmt. h (cited in 
note 14); see also John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems:  A Policy Analysis, 86 
Am J Intl L 310, 329 (1992) (“It seems safe to conclude that the U.S. constitutional practice and status is 
that the treaty-making officials, as a unilateral matter, will control the determination of ‘self-executing’ in 
the domestic legal system.”). 
69 See Thomas Buergenthal, Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and 
International Law, 235 Recueil des Cours 303, 315-19 (1992 IV); Duncan B. Hollis, A Comparative 
Approach to Treaty Law and Practice, in National Treaty Law and Practice 1, 40-47 (Duncan B. Hollis, 
Merritt R. Blakeslee, and L. Benjamin Ederington eds., 2005). 
70 Lori F. Damrosch et al., International Law:  Cases and Materials 160-61 (4th ed 2001). 
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If the search for self-execution turned on the collective intent of the parties, it would 
almost always be a meaningless exercise.
Although some advocates of the intent-of-the-parties approach recognize that 
there will almost never be any collective intent with respect to self-execution,71 they 
argue that allowing senatorial and presidential intent to control on this issue would be 
unconstitutional because it would give the Senate and President a lawmaking power 
outside of the Article II Treaty Clause.72  While the Constitution allows the Senate and 
President to make law in the form of treaties, these commentators contend that this is true 
only when they do so in conjunction with one or more other nations.  Therefore, the 
argument goes, if the regulation of self-execution is not done in conjunction with other 
nations, it is an unconstitutional exercise of lawmaking authority.
 This argument is unpersuasive because it fails to distinguish between the making 
of substantive treaty commitments, which is governed by international law, and the self-
execution issue, which, at least under current practice, concerns an issue of domestic law.  
The making of substantive treaty commitments requires the consent of one or more other 
nations because this is what is required by international law in order for there to be a 
binding treaty.  Nations naturally bargain over those substantive terms, and, just as with 
domestic contracts, the relevant intent for those terms is the collective intent of the 
parties.  Moreover, there is an interest in having relatively uniform interpretations of 
these terms among the parties, in part for reciprocity reasons.  Self-execution, by contrast, 
is not a matter of international law – the United States would not violate international law 
by either having, or not having, self-execution.  Nor is there any particular need or desire 
for uniformity in the approaches to self-execution.  While one could imagine nations 
bargaining over whether to require direct judicial enforcement of a treaty, it almost never 
happens.
Although the regulation of self-execution could be described as a type of 
lawmaking power (and, as discussed below, the Supreme Court did refer to it this way in 
Medellín), it is not a constitutionally problematic lawmaking power when exercised by 
two-thirds of the Senate and the President.  It is not a freestanding power, but rather is 
simply an adjunct to the treaty-making power set forth in Article II, and it only comes up 
if the full process for making a treaty has been satisfied.  Moreover, it is not a power to 
create any new obligations for the United States, but rather is simply a power to regulate 
how those obligations are implemented internally.  It can therefore reasonably be viewed 
as a lesser-included power of the Senate and President’s authority not to ratify the treaty 
at all, which would also prevent judicial enforcement of the treaty.73  The principal 
argument against such a lesser-included power is that the Supremacy Clause forces the 
71 See, e.g., Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 607 (cited in note 7) (“[E]xcept in the rarest of cases, 
courts searching for a common intent of the parties regarding the need for implementing legislation do so in 
vain.”). 
72 See, e.g., id at 639; Riesenfeld & Abbott, 67 Chi-Kent L Rev at 599 (cited in note 44). 
73 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 303, reporters’ 
note 4 (cited in note 14). 
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U.S. treatymakers to accept judicial enforceability whenever they ratify a treaty 
susceptible to judicial enforcement.  But, as discussed above in Part II, nothing in the text 
or history of Clause, or in judicial precedent, suggests that the Clause operates in that 
way.
 There is one lower court decision from the 1950s that offers support for the Treaty 
Clause argument, but it is poorly reasoned, was vacated as moot by the Supreme Court, 
and has had no influence since it was decided.  That decision, Power Authority of New 
York v Federal Power Commission,74 involved a treaty between the United States and 
Canada pursuant to which the two countries agreed to share water on the Niagara River.  
A preexisting federal statute gave the Federal Power Commission the authority to issue 
licenses concerning the use of U.S. waters.  In approving the treaty with Canada, 
however, the Senate had attached to its advice and consent what it referred to as a 
“reservation” stating that “no project for redevelopment of the United States’ share of 
such [Niagara River] waters shall be undertaken until it be specifically authorized by Act 
of Congress.”  As a result of this reservation, the Commission concluded that it lacked 
authority to issue a license concerning the use of the Niagara River water.   
 In a 2-1 decision, the D.C. Circuit reversed the Commission.  The majority 
concluded that the Senate’s reservation was constitutionally problematic, and the court 
therefore assumed that the Senate did not intend it to be binding. The court reasoned that 
the Constitution gives the Senate and President only the power to make a “Treaty,” and 
that a treaty must concern matters of mutual concern to the other treaty parties.  The court 
suggested, however, that the Senate’s reservation was not part of the treaty because it 
“makes no change in the relationship between the United States and Canada under the 
treaty and has nothing at all to do with the rights or obligations of either party.”75  The 
court cited, with apparent approval, occasional statements by officials and courts 
suggesting that the Article II treaty power might be limited to matters of international 
concern.
 The majority’s analysis is questionable.  There may be genuine reasons to be 
concerned about the scope of the treaty power, and I have myself highlighted some of 
those reasons in prior writings.76  Among other things, the treaty power might be used to 
circumvent federalism restraints that would otherwise apply to Congress.  But a decision 
by the Senate and President simply to defer an internal policy question for resolution by 
the full Congress, as in Power Authority, does not implicate these concerns.  As the 
dissent explained in that case: 
74 247 F2d 538 (DC Cir), vacated as moot sub nom, American Public Power Association v Power 
Authority of New York, 355 US 64 (1957). 
75 Id at 541.  
76 See Bradley, 97 Mich L Rev 390 (cited in note 3); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and 
American Federalism, Part II, 99 Mich L Rev 98 (2000).  See also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing 
the Treaty Power, 118 Harv L Rev 1867 (2005). 
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“It may well be that, no matter how broad the power to make treaties, it is 
not without limits; and that, like any other power, it can be abused.  This 
case, however, does not pose an abuse of the treaty power.  The 
reservation in question is an instance of self-denial, not usurpation.  It does 
not subvert our constitutional system.  It was motivated by a desire that the 
treaty power should not be used in a manner which would exclude the 
Congress at large and the President from playing their normal roles in 
making domestic law.”77
Professor Henkin, in a trenchant article criticizing the decision, similarly explained that 
“[t]here has been no mala fides, no ‘repeal’ of legislation, no ‘colorable use of the treaty-
making power’ for an extraneous, improper purpose.  The President and Senate have 
merely refused to throw new and valuable resources into an old established system of 
development which Congress may not have intended and may not now desire.”78
 In any event, the decision has had essentially no influence.  Not a single court has 
relied on this decision since it was issued more than fifty years ago.79  Nor has the 
decision affected political branch practice, which, since the decision, has developed to 
include the use of non-self-execution declarations.  These declarations have consistently 
been upheld by the lower courts, and the Supreme Court recently suggested that they are 
valid.80  Even in academic writings, the Power Authority decision has not been invoked 
extensively.  One likely reason is that its suggestion that the treaty power might be 
limited to matters of international rather than domestic concern is a difficult distinction to 
apply in practice and could easily lead to undesirable consequences.  If applied 
stringently, this distinction might render invalid the U.S. ratification of a variety of 
important treaties, including many human rights treaties, since those treaties do not 
involve reciprocal promises in the traditional sense.  (The U.S. government does not 
condition its promise to respect the human rights of its citizens on other countries’ respect 
for the human rights of their citizens.)  Probably in part for this reason, the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations rejects any effort to have treaty validity turn on the 
domestic-versus-international distinction.81
 The intent-of-the-U.S. approach is not only constitutionally valid, it also best 
explains judicial and political branch practice.  Unlike an intent-of-the-parties approach, 
this approach has an easy time explaining the consistent deference that courts have given 
77 247 F.2d at 552 (Bastian, J, dissenting). 
78 Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers:  The Niagara Reservation, 56 Colum L 
Rev 1151, 1173 (1956).  
79 One dissenting judge relied on it.  See Igartua-de la Rosa v United States, 417 F3d 145, 191 (1st 
Cir 2005) (Howard, J, dissenting). 
80 See Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692, 735 (2004) (noting that the United States ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “on the express understanding that it was not self-
executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts”) (emphasis added). 
81 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 302, cmt. c and 
reporters’ note 2 (cited in note 14). 
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to non-self-execution declarations attached by the Senate and accepted by the President.  
Under the intent-of-the-U.S. approach, these declarations are clear evidence of senatorial 
and presidential intent concerning self-execution, which is the relevant intent for this 
issue.  Commentators who argue for an intent-of-the-parties approach, by contrast, either 
find these declarations unconstitutional or have a difficult time explaining their validity.82
Moreover, the intent-of-the-U.S. approach would find valid the recent self-execution
declarations attached by the Senate, as long as the treaty was otherwise susceptible to 
judicial application.  An intent-of-the-parties approach, by contrast, would likely see 
these declarations as unconstitutionally expanding the international obligations of the 
United States.83  It is also worth noting that, outside of the human rights area, 
declarations concerning self-execution have not typically been included in the 
instruments of ratification that are communicated to the other treaty parties, and the 
Senate has not been recommending their inclusion in these instruments afte 84
Such communication would presumably be a constitutional prerequisite, however, unde
an intent-of-the-parties approach.
r Medellín.   
r
h.
85  All of this purported unconstitutionality should at 
least give us pause before committing to the intent-of-the-parties approac 86
 The intent-of-the-U.S. approach also explains why it is perfectly appropriate for 
courts to consider treaty text when discerning self-execution, as they have done since 
Foster.  Treaty text is relevant under this approach because it is what the Senate and 
President specifically approve when agreeing to the treaty, just as statutory text is 
relevant in discerning congressional intent with respect to whether and to what extent a 
statute is to be judicially enforceable.  This is true, under the intent-of-the-U.S. approach, 
regardless of whether the treaty text would mean something different to other treaty 
parties on this question of self-execution (or mean nothing at all to them on this 
question).  The textual question under the intent-of-the-U.S. approach is, simply, did the 
Senate and President intend in agreeing to this language that the treaty would be directly 
enforceable in U.S. courts?  As discussed below, this is precisely the reasoning of the 
82 See, e.g., Riesenfeld & Abbott, 67 Chi-Kent L Rev at 296 (cited in note 44) (arguing that  
“the Senate lacks the constitutional authority to declare the non-self-executing character of a treaty with 
binding effect on U.S. courts”); Sloss, 36 UC Davis L Rev at 41-43 (cited in note 25) (arguing that the 
declarations are invalid when used in certain ways); Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 672-85 (cited in note 7) 
(struggling with the issue and ultimately concluding that the declarations are valid based on a complicated 
analysis of the international law validity of a hypothetical reservation of non-self-execution). 
83 See Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 687-88 (cited in note 7).  Professor Vázquez attempts to use 
the purported unconstitutionality of such declarations as a reason for a presumption in favor of self-
execution.  See id at 690-91.  If the self-execution declarations are in fact constitutional, that reason goes 
away.
84 See text accompanying note 32. 
85 See, e.g., Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 641 (cited in note 7) (arguing for such a requirement). 
86 Congress’s ability to regulate self-execution may also be at stake.  Compare Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts:  A Critical Guide, 101 
Am J Intl L 73, 89-91 (2007) (arguing that a congressional restriction on judicial enforcement of the 
Geneva Conventions would be unconstitutional), with Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, 
Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions, 101 Am J Intl L 322, 339-41 (2007) (challenging that 
claim). 
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Supreme Court in Medellín.  Supporters of the intent-of-the-parties approach, by contrast, 
have a difficult time explaining why text is relevant.  Professor Vázquez, for example, 
criticizes judicial reliance on treaty text in discerning whether treaties are self-executing: 
“Because nations negotiating treaties rarely, if ever, select the wording of 
a treaty with the question of legislative implementation in mind, judges 
who draw conclusions about this question from treaty text are very likely 
attributing to the words a meaning that was not intended by the parties.”87
As made clear by the italicized language, this argument only holds if the relevant intent is 
that of the parties, which, as I have argued, it is not. 
 Contrary to what some commentators appear to assume, an endorsement of the 
intent-of-the-U.S. approach, by allowing for unilateral declarations of self-execution or 
non-self-execution, does not require acceptance of something akin to legislative history in 
the statutory context.  Unlike legislative history, declarations regarding self-execution are 
subject to the same domestic process as the underlying enactment:  the declarations are 
voted on by the Senate as part of its resolution of advice and consent and take effect only 
if the President decides to proceed with ratification after being presented with them.  
These declarations are therefore in effect part of the relevant text, not a mere piece of 
legislative history.88  The extent to which a court should look at other materials in 
discerning the intent of the U.S. treaty-makers, such as ratification history, depends on 
one’s theory of interpretation, and no particular conclusion on this is compelled by the 
intent-of-the-U.S. approach.  That said, even hard-line textualists who resist the use of 
legislative history might accept the relevance of certain considerations beyond the words 
of the treaty, to the extent that those considerations shed light on how the text would 
likely be understood by the U.S. treatymakers (or the relevant domestic public) with 
respect to the issue of self-execution.  These considerations might include the extent to 
which Congress has already regulated the subject covered by the treaty, the existence or 
non-existence of a history of domestic judicial enforcement of similar treaty terms, and 
perhaps even the structural or functional consequences of self-execution or non-self-
execution.  As a result, there are likely to be materials for courts to work with beyond the 
words of the treaty regardless of whether they consider statements made in the 
ratification history. 
 In sum, when the United States enters into a treaty, one of the decisions it can 
make concerns whether and to what extent the treaty is to be implemented directly by its 
courts.  Although this decision may have international consequences, it does not typically 
involve an international bargain, and it is not determined by international law.  Instead, it 
87 Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 635 (cited in note 7) (emphasis added); see also id at 640 (“[T]he 
treaty itself will almost never have any relevant content on the question of direct enforceability.”); id at 660 
(“[V]irtually all treaties have no relevant content on the question of direct versus indirect judicial 
enforceability.”). 
88 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee sometimes expresses a view about self-execution in 
the ratification materials rather than in a formal declaration included with the Senate’s resolution of advice 
and consent.  I am referring here only to the formal declarations. 
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concerns a political decision about how the nation will address its treaty obligations, a 
decision that may be influenced by a mix of structural, diplomatic, and policy 
considerations.  The proper institutions to make this decision are the political institutions 
involved in committing the United States to the underlying treaty obligations, and it is 
therefore their intent that it is relevant. 
IV. STATUTES AND TREATIES
As discussed in Part II, there are a variety of situations in which federal statutes 
are not judicially enforceable, even though statutes are part of the supreme law of the 
land.  Proponents of a broad doctrine of treaty self-execution respond that, even if this is 
so, treaties should be no less enforceable than federal statutes, something that Professor 
Vázquez calls “the requirement of equivalent treatment.”89  My third claim, which I 
defend in this Part, is that there are important differences between statutes and treaties 
that are relevant to judicial enforceability, and these differences suggest less of a judicial 
role for enforcing treaties than for statutes, especially in the modern (i.e., post-New Deal 
and World War II) era. 
 One difference between statutes and treaties concerns the way that they are 
drafted.  Because treaties are international bargains that reflect the input of other nations, 
they are less likely than statutes to be drafted with either extant U.S. law or the U.S. legal 
system in mind.  As a result, it is not uncommon for treaties to use legal terms and 
concepts that are different from those typically used in the United States, even when the 
policies of the treaties are otherwise in accord with U.S. law.  In addition, while treaties 
are increasingly drafted to achieve statute-like objectives, the need to find common 
ground among countries with widely varied legal systems, cultures, and preferences often 
results in a lack of statutory precision.  These drafting differences between statutes and 
treaties are likely to be particularly evident for multilateral treaties that have numerous 
parties.
 Another difference between statutes and treaties is that treaties are less likely to 
envision domestic courts, or even judicial review more generally, as the vehicle of their 
enforcement.  Whereas U.S. statutes are enacted against the backdrop of a well-
developed practice of judicial review that includes a centralized national court system, 
treaties are negotiated against the backdrop of a decentralized system with a wide variety 
of legal systems, and the drafters often envision different enforcement mechanisms than 
statutes, most commonly diplomacy, but sometimes (as in the case of the UN Charter 
provision at issue in Medellín) coordinated international sanctions.  While it may seem 
strange in this country to think of law as divorced from judicial review, as explained in 
Part II this is not at all strange on the international stage, and international lawyers have 
long insisted that international law is law despite the absence of judicial enforceability. 
89 Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 602 (cited in note 7). 
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 Unlike statutes, treaties are also a hybrid of contract and law.  Treaties inherently 
involve contractual commitments to other nations and thus implicate considerations of 
international politics and diplomacy, considerations that are particularly the domain of 
the Executive Branch.  To be sure, proponents of presumptive self-execution 
understandably bristle when courts (including the Court in Medellín) quote from The
Head Money Cases for the proposition that “[a] treaty is primarily a compact between 
independent nations” that “depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest 
and the honor of the governments which are parties to it.”90  Proponents correctly note 
that the Court further observed in that case that “a treaty may also contain provisions 
which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in 
the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law and which 
are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country.”91
Nevertheless, the language from The Head Money Cases reflects an important truth, 
which is that, unlike statutes, treaties operate not only within the domain of law, but also 
within the domain of international politics.  The hybrid nature of treaties helps explain 
why they are probably subject to termination by the President unilaterally,92 whereas this 
is of course not true for statutes.93  It also explains why courts tend to give greater 
deference to Executive interpretations of treaties than they give to Executive 
interpretations of statutes (even taking into account the Chevron deference doctrine in 
administrative law).94
 Treaties and statutes also differ in the way that they engage with the U.S. 
democratic process.  Statutes are enacted after two houses of Congress deliberate on and 
approve them, often with much wrangling over the text, and they are signed by the 
President or passed with enough votes to override the President’s veto.  Treaties, by 
contrast, are negotiated by the President and then approved by a supermajority of the 
Senate, which as a matter of practice has little if any involvement in negotiating the 
treaty’s text and, subject to an ability in some instances to decline consent to particular 
treaty provisions, has no authority to amend the product of the negotiation.  By leaving 
out the House of Representatives entirely and leaving even the Senate out of the 
negotiation and drafting process, treaty-making involves less of the machinery of 
90 Head Money Cases, 112 US 580, 598 (1884). 
91 Id. 
92 See Goldwater v Carter, 617 F2d 697 (DC Cir 1979), vacated, 444 US 886 (1979). 
93 Professor Vázquez spends considerable effort seeking to rebut the proposition that the 
contractual nature of treaties prevents them from being enforced through domestic courts.  See Vázquez, 
122 Harv L Rev at 623-27 (cited in note 7).  That proposition is not a serious one, however, and it is not my 
contention here.  Nor does Professor Vázquez’s rebuttal of that proposition establish, as he ultimately 
asserts, that the contractual nature of treaties is “irrelevant” to the self-execution issue.  See id at 626 
(referring to the purported “irrelevance” of the fact that treaties are contracts between nations). 
94 See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v Avagliano, 457 US 176, 184-85 (1982) (“Although 
not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their 
negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.”); see also Medellín v Texas, 128 S Ct 1346, 1361 
(2008).  Unlike Chevron deference, courts defer to Executive interpretations of treaties even when 
expressed for the first time in litigation.  See, e.g., De Los Santos Mora v New York, 524 F3d 183, 204 (2d 
Cir 2008). 
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representative U.S. democracy than do statutes.  Indeed, this is a principal point cited by 
supporters of the use of congressional-executive agreements, which involve the full 
Congress.95  Even if there are advantages to having a less transparent and populist 
process for concluding agreements with other nations (as the constitutional Founders 
believed), from a democratic theory perspective treaties are probably a less attractive 
vehicle than statutes for making domestic law.96  This is presumably part of the reason 
that it has long been assumed that, unlike statutes, treaties may not by themselves create 
criminal liability in the United States.97
 Defenders of self-execution equivalency for statutes and treaties often point to the 
“last-in-time doctrine,” which holds that, when there is a conflict between a federal 
statute and a self-executing treaty, U.S. courts will apply the later in time of the two 
enactments.98  This doctrine, however, makes no claim about the extent to which treaties 
and statutes should be judicially enforceable, but rather simply holds that when both are 
enforceable the later in time is controlling.  In any event, despite the doctrine, it appears 
that courts have been quite reluctant to allow treaties to displace statutes.  There is only 
one Supreme Court decision that has clearly allowed a treaty to supersede a statute, Cook
v United States, and in that case the Executive Branch pushed for this outcome and thus 
sought to overturn the actions of its own Coast Guard.99  Moreover, as Professor Tim Wu 
has noted, “because non-self-execution or other doctrines of deference can be, and are, 
used to prevent a later-in-time treaty from abrogating an earlier statute, the last-in-time 
rule is not a full or accurate portrayal of judicial practice.”100
 The reluctance of U.S. courts to allow treaties to supersede federal statutes can be 
traced back to the decision that is said to be the genesis of the self-execution doctrine, 
Foster v Neilson.101 Foster involved an 1819 treaty between the United States and Spain 
95 See, e.g., Hathaway, 117 Yale LJ 1236 (cited in note 2). 
96 In many instances it is likely to turn out that the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate will 
represent a majority of the country’s population, but this will not necessarily be the case.  If large states are 
in dissent, two-thirds of the Senate can represent substantially less than a majority of the population, given 
that small and large state have equal representation in the Senate.  See Yoo, Treaties and Public 
Lawmaking, 99 Colum L Rev at 2240 n.79 (cited in note 11).  Senators also of course have much longer 
terms than members of the House, which (by design) may make them less responsive to democratic 
majorities. 
97 See, e.g., Hopson v Krebs, 622 F2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir 1980); United States v Postal, 589 F2d 
862, 877 (5th Cir 1979); The Over the Top, 5 F2d 838, 845 (D Conn 1925). 
98 See, e.g., Whitney v Robertson, 124 US 190, 194 (1888); Cook v United States, 282 US 102, 
118-19 (1933).  There is debate among commentators over whether the last-in-time rule is consistent with 
Founding understandings, with some commentators claiming that treaties should always trump statutes, 
other commentators claiming that statutes should always trump treaties, and still other commentators 
defending the status quo.   
99 See 288 US 102 (1933); Wu, 93 Va L Rev at 597 (cited in note 26). 
100 Wu, 93 Va L Rev at 595-96 (cited in note 26). 
101 See 27 US at 314-15.  The concept of non-self-executing treaties predated Foster.  Justice 
Iredell discussed the concept, for example, in his circuit court decision in the Ware v Hylton case in the 
1790s.  See 3 US 199, 272 (1796) (Iredell, J.). 
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that ceded certain disputed territory east of the Mississippi River to the United States. 
The petitioners claimed title to a tract of land within the territory based on an 1804 grant 
from Spain, and on that basis sought to eject the respondent from the tract. The English-
version of the treaty provided in relevant part that all grants of land made by Spain in the 
ceded territory prior to the treaty “shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in 
possession of the lands to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the 
territories had remained under the dominion” of Spain.  The Court famously concluded 
that this provision was in “the language of contract” and therefore “addresse[d] itself to 
the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract 
before it can become a rule for the Court.”102
 What many descriptions of this decision fail to note is that, before concluding the 
treaty with Spain, the U.S. government had taken the position that the area encompassing 
the tract at issue in the case had already been ceded by Spain to France in 1800, and that 
France had conveyed it to the United States in 1803 as part of the Louisiana Purchase.  
This view, moreover, was reflected in several federal statutes enacted prior to the treaty.  
It was against that backdrop that the Supreme Court concluded that “the legislature must 
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court” and that, in the meantime, 
the Court was “not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject.”103
 Critics of Foster often point out that the Court changed its view about the 
enforceability of the treaty provision several years later in United States v Percheman,
after examining the Spanish version of the treaty.104  Critics contend that Percheman
shows the weakness of the Foster precedent and provides support for a presumption in 
favor of self-execution.105  Importantly, however, the land at issue in Percheman was 
indisputably within Spanish territory at the time of the 1819 treaty and thus, unlike in 
Foster, the grant in question did not pose a potential conflict with preexisting statutes.106
This pair of decisions, therefore, can be seen as an early marker of judicial reluctance to 
allow treaties to displace Congress’s legislative role (a reluctance also confirmed by 
Professor Wu’s work). 
 The Power Authority decision, discussed in the last Part, may be another example 
of this reluctance.  In reversing the Federal Power Commission and declining to give 
effect to the purported reservation, the Power Authority decision is said to undermine the 
legitimacy of non-self-execution declarations sometimes attached by the Senate today to 
its advice and consent to treaties.  As discussed above, to the extent that it does indict 
such declarations, its reasoning is unpersuasive, and it has had essentially no influence on 
102 27 US at 314-15. 
103 Id at 314-15 (emphasis added). 
104
105 See, e.g., Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 607-08, 644-45 (cited in note 7). 
106 See United States v Percheman, 32 US (7 Pet) 51, 88-89 (1833); see also Garcia v Lee, 37 US 
511, 520 (1838) (noting this distinction between Foster and Percheman and stating that “the case of Foster 
and Elam v. Neilson must, in all other respects, be considered as affirmed by that of The United States v. 
Percheman”); Buergenthal, 235 Recueil des Cours at 373 (cited in note 69) (also noting this distinction). 
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subsequent practice.  The decision can reasonably be read more narrowly, however, in 
light of the statutory backdrop in that case, which by its terms appeared to give the 
Commission licensing authority over the newly acquired water. In that light, the decision 
can be seen as reflecting the reluctance of a court to allow a treaty provision (or treaty 
reservation) to override a federal statutory scheme, which was in fact the thrust of an 
important academic brief submitted on behalf of the petitioner in that case.107  Indeed, as 
Professor Henkin noted in commenting on the Power Authority decision, “it seems 
doubtful . . . that anyone would have challenged the power of the Senate and President to 
append a provision that development of the waters of the Niagara was to await 
congressional action, had there been no applicable legislation.”108
Assuming this reluctance to allow treaties to displace Congress’s legislative role 
is justified, it suggests a greater potential scope for non-self-execution today than might 
have been true in the past.  In the modern era, both statutes and treaties have proliferated, 
and the content and structure of treaty-making has changed such that treaties are often the 
vehicle for broad-based legislative efforts.  These developments mean, among other 
things, that statutes and treaties are much more likely to overlap with one another and to 
express potentially different policy choices.  Even when treaties reflect policies similar to 
those in existing U.S. statutes, treaties (as noted above) tend to use different language 
than is used in the statutes and thus, if enforced directly, may require significant litigation 
to work out the implications of this language.  (As discussed in Part I, this is one reason 
the Senate routinely includes non-self-execution declarations with its advice and consent 
to human rights treaties.)109  One should expect, therefore, that in the modern era courts 
would become less willing to apply treaties directly as rules of decision, and this is 
precisely what appears to have happened.  As discussed earlier, the lower courts in the 
post-World War II period have come close to presuming against self-execution, at least 
for multilateral treaties and other treaties not covered by prior lines of precedent.110
 The rise of congressional-executive agreements also may reduce the need for and 
desirability of direct judicial application of treaties.111  As the overlap between treaty-
107 See Opinion of Philip C. Jessup & Oliver J. Lissitzyn for the Power Authority of the State of 
New York (Dec. 1955) (on file with author); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, 149 U Pa L Rev at 453 (cited in 
note 22) (discussing this point). 
108 Henkin, 56 Colum L Rev at 1172 (cited in note 78). 
109 See text accompanying note 23. 
110 See text accompanying note 15; see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, § 111 reporters note 5 (cited in note 14) (“Treaties on subjects that Congress has 
regulated extensively are more likely to be interpreted as non-self-executing.”). 
111 Professor Vázquez attempts to invoke the phenomenon of congressional-executive agreements 
as support for treaty self-execution, arguing that if an international agreement is not likely to be self-
executing, the President would have no reason to use the Article II process instead of the congressional-
executive agreement process, and thus the choice of the Article II process must suggest a desire for self-
execution.  See Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 691-92 (cited in note 7).  This argument is questionable on a 
number of levels.  As a legal matter, it is far from clear that congressional-executive agreements benefit 
from the Missouri v Holland rule that allows Article II treaties (and legislation implementing them) to 
regulate matters beyond the scope of Congress’s authority.  See, e.g., Hathaway, 117 Yale LJ at 1339 (cited 
in note 2) (concluding that Missouri v Holland does not apply to congressional-executive agreements).  If 
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making and legislating has increased, so has the number of congressional-executive 
agreements, such that now they constitute the vast majority of international agreements 
concluded by the United States.  As supporters of this development emphasize, these 
agreements have the virtue of including the full Congress in considering whether to 
approve a treaty, and in deciding how the treaty should be accommodated within the 
framework of existing U.S. law.  The shift to these agreements also reduces the issue of 
self-execution, since Congress often specifies the level of judicial enforceability that it 
wants when approving the agreements (sometimes substantially limiting such 
enforceability).112  Furthermore, it is easier to analogize these congressional-executive
agreements to statutes for purposes of judicial enforceability because they actually are 
statutes. 
V. MEDELLÍN AND ITS AMBIGUITIES
This Part discusses the Supreme Court’s decision last Term in Medellín v Texas
and explains how, despite some ambiguities, it is generally consistent with the three 
claims defended above.113  In doing so, this Part critiques several aspects of Professor 
Vázquez’s contrary account of the decision in his recent article in the Harvard Law 
Review.
 A. Medellín
Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a treaty that the United 
States ratified in 1969, when foreign nationals are arrested in the United States, the 
arresting authorities are obligated to inform the foreign nationals that they have the right 
to have their consulate notified of the arrest and to communicate with the consulate.114
Under a separate Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention that it also ratified in 1969, 
the United States further agreed to have disputes arising under the Vienna Convention 
heard by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
 In a 2004 decision, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, the 
ICJ concluded that the United States had violated the consular notice rights of 51 
not, that would constitute an independent legal reason for the President to use the Article II treaty process 
in some instances, regardless of whether the treaty will be self-executing.  In addition, there might be all 
sorts of non-legal reasons why the President would continue to use the Article II process for certain 
agreements that have nothing to do with self-execution, such as the avoidance of likely political resistance 
from the Senate.  This appears to be the case, for example, in the arms control area, see Curtis A. Bradley 
& Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law:  Cases and Materials 554-55, 558 (3d ed 2009) 
(documenting successful Senate insistence on use of Article II process for arms control treaties), and yet it 
is unlikely that arms control treaties are generally self-executing. 
112 See Hathaway, 117 Yale LJ at 1321 (cited in note 2); Wu, 93 Va L Rev at 648 (cited in note 
26). 
113 My analysis in this Part draws upon an earlier article.  See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, 
Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 Am J Intl L 540 (2008). 
114 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36. 
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Mexican nationals on death row in various states, and that it was obligated to provide 
these nationals with “review and reconsideration” of their convictions and sentences in 
light of the violations, notwithstanding any procedural defaults that might otherwise bar 
such review and reconsideration.115  Under a provision in another treaty – Article 94 of 
the United Nations Charter – a member of the United Nations (such as the United States) 
“undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case 
to which it is a party.”116
 After the ICJ’s decision in Avena, the U.S. government took the position that the 
ICJ had erred in concluding that the Vienna Convention overrode domestic rules of 
procedural default, and the Supreme Court agreed with the government in a 2006 
decision, Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, that did not involve any of the 51 Mexican nationals 
covered by the Avena decision.117  The government also took the position that, although 
an ICJ decision to which the United States is a party is binding on the United States as a 
matter of international law, it does not “provide a free-standing source of law on which a 
private party may rely in domestic judicial proceedings.”118  Despite taking these 
positions, President Bush issued a memorandum to his Attorney General in February 
2005 stating that the United States would comply with the Avena decision by having its 
state courts give effect to the decision “in accordance with general principles of comity” 
in the 51 cases covered by the decision, and the government took the position that this 
memorandum was binding on state courts.  Shortly thereafter, the United States withdrew 
from the Optional Protocol, which had been the basis for the ICJ’s jurisdiction in Avena.
Jose Ernesto Medellín, one of the 51 Mexican nationals covered by the Avena
decision, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Texas in 1994.  He first 
raised a Vienna Convention claim in state post-conviction proceedings, and the state 
courts held that the claim was procedurally defaulted because it had not been raised on 
direct review.  Medellín subsequently sought federal habeas corpus relief, which was 
denied.  After President Bush issued the memorandum concerning compliance with 
Avena, Medellín once against initiated state post-conviction proceedings.  The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief, concluding that neither the Avena decision nor 
the President’s memorandum operated to displace Texas’s law of procedural default. 
 In Medellín v Texas, the Supreme Court affirmed.119  The Court, in an opinion 
authored by Chief Justice Roberts, first held that the U.S. obligation to comply with the 
ICJ’s decision in Avena was not self-executing and thus did not override Texas’s law of 
procedural default.  The Court examined Article 94 and the other treaty provisions to 
115 2004 ICJ Rep 12 (Mar. 31), reprinted in 43 ILM 581 (2004). 
116 United Nations Charter, art. 94(1). 
117 See Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US 331 (2006). 
118 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Ex parte Jose Ernesto Medellin, at 14 (Tex Ct 
Crim App Sept. 2, 2005), at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/CCA%20US%20Amicus.PDF. 
119 See 128 S Ct 1346 (2008). 
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determine whether they “convey[ed] an intention” of self-execution,120 and concluded 
that they did not.  Endorsing the U.S. government’s argument on this point, the Court 
explained that the phrase “undertakes to comply” in Article 94 does not constitute “a 
directive to domestic courts” but rather constitutes a commitment to take future political 
branch action.121  The Court noted that Article 94 “does not provide that the United 
States ‘shall’ or ‘must’ comply with an ICJ decision, nor indicate that the Senate that 
ratified the U. N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in
domestic courts.”
olitical branches.”
dividuals.
a
122  Rather, the Court understood the language of Article 94 as 
“confirm[ing] that further action to give effect to an ICJ judgment was contemplated.”123
In a concurrence, Justice Stevens similarly reasoned that the phrase “undertakes to 
comply,” especially when read in context, is best construed as “contemplat[ing] future 
action by the p 124
 In addition to relying on the “undertakes to comply” language, the Court noted 
that the remainder of Article 94 expressly set forth an enforcement mechanism for 
noncompliance with ICJ decisions – reference of the matter to the UN Security Council 
for possible sanctions.  The Court reasoned that “[t]he U.N. Charter’s provision of an 
express diplomatic – that is, nonjudicial – remedy is itself evidence that ICJ judgments 
were not meant to be enforceable in domestic courts.”125  The Court also cited evidence 
suggesting that, when it submitted the UN Charter to the Senate, the Executive Branch 
envisioned that the Security Council would be the only avenue for enforcement of ICJ 
decisions.126  More generally, the Court accorded deference to the Executive Branch’s 
views about the treaties, noting that the Executive Branch had “unfailingly adhered to its 
view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal law.”127
The Court further emphasized particular features of the ICJ adjudicatory system, 
including the fact that the ICJ can only hear disputes involving nations, not 
128in
Finally, the Court observed that the consequences of giving direct effect to ICJ 
judgments “give pause.”129  The Court expressed particular concern that, under such 
regime, even erroneous ICJ decisions could override state law, and potentially even 
120 Id at 1356 (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v United States, 417 F3d 145, 150 (1st Cir 2005) (en 
banc)). 
t 1358. 
tevens, J, concurring). 
0.
t 1364. 
121 Id a
122 Id. 
123 Id at 1359 n. 5. 
124 Id at 1373 (S
125 Id at 1359. 
126 Id at 1359-6
127 Id at 1361. 
128 Id at 1360. 
129 Id a
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federal law.130  The Court also worried that the ICJ would have the ability to bind U.S. 
courts to extreme remedies, such as “annul[ling] criminal convictions and sentences, for 
any reason deemed sufficient by the ICJ.”131  For these reasons, the Court suggested that 
it was unlikely that the U.S. political branches had intended for the obligation to comply 
ents to be self-executing.
,
ts,
te
– not 
f-
ressed 
d give the 
diciary “the power not only to interpret but also to create the law.”135
’s
 the 
er under Justice Jackson’s framework from the 
oungstown steel seizure case.137
with ICJ judgm
 In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected what it called the “multifactor
judgment by judgment” approach to self-execution suggested by Justice Breyer in 
dissent, whereby courts would consider not only treaty text and drafting history, but also 
the treaty’s subject matter, whether the treaty provision confers specific individual righ
and whether direct enforcement of the treaty would require the courts to create a new 
cause of action.132  The Court reasoned that such an approach would be too indetermina
and would give the courts too much discretion, thereby “assign[ing] to the courts 
the political branches – the primary role in deciding when and how international 
agreements will be enforced.”133  The Court particularly objected that, under the dissent’s 
proposed approach, a treaty provision could be self-executing in some cases and non-sel
executing in others.  The Court thought it “hard to believe that the United States would 
enter into treaties that are sometimes enforceable and sometimes not,”134 and it exp
concern that allowing courts to make such case-by-case judgments woul
ju
 In addition to its finding of non-self-execution, the Court held that the President
memorandum did not have the effect of overriding Texas’s law of procedural default.
The Court reasoned that the conversion of a non-self-executing treaty obligation into self-
executing federal law is an act of lawmaking that falls to Congress, not the President.136
The Court further reasoned that, “[w]hen the President asserts the power to ‘enforce’ a 
non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally creating domestic law, he acts in conflict with 
the implicit understanding of the ratifying Senate,” and therefore his action falls into
lowest category of presidential pow
Y
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 See id at 1362-63; id at 1382-83 (Breyer, J, dissenting). 
133 Id at 1363. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 See id at 1368-69. 
137 Id at 1369; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers 
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”). 
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B. Analysis 
The Court’s decision in Medellín is generally consistent with the three claims 
defended above:  that the inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause does not by itself 
tell us the extent to which treaties are judicially enforceable; that the relevant intent in 
discerning self-execution is that of the U.S. treatymakers; and that there are important 
differences between statutes and treaties that are relevant to their judicial enforceability. 
Supreme Law of the Land 
 Consider first the relationship between Supremacy Clause and judicial 
enforceability.  The Court obviously saw no contradiction between that Clause and the 
concept of non-self-execution.  It cited Foster with approval and did not treat it as some 
deviation from the Constitution that had to be grudgingly accommodated because of stare 
decisis. 
 Nor did the Court view the Supremacy Clause as mandating a presumption in 
favor of self-execution.  The Court did not mention any such presumption, and, in 
concluding that the treaties in question were non-self-executing, it did not require clear 
evidence of an intent to preclude domestic judicial enforcement.  Instead, it carefully 
examined the text, structure, and ratification history of the treaties to discern whether 
they were self-executing.  The Court also emphasized that “Congress is up to the task of 
implementing non-self-executing treaties,”138 further suggesting that it did not have in 
mind a presumption in favor of self-execution. 
 Professor Vázquez argues that Medellín is consistent with a general presumption 
in favor of self-execution, but his claim depends upon an unlikely reading of the Court’s 
reasoning.  Professor Vázquez suggests that the Supreme Court interpreted Article 94 of 
the UN Charter as leaving parties to the Charter, including the United States, “some 
discretion not to comply” with ICJ decisions.139  Instead of interpreting Article 94 as 
imposing a “hard” obligation on the United States to comply with Avena, he contends 
that the Court interpreted it as merely imposing a “soft” obligation to try to comply, or to 
use its best efforts to comply.140  As a result, Professor Vázquez argues that the Court’s 
non-self-execution analysis should be limited to treaty provisions that, as a matter of 
international law, convey nonjusticiable political discretion. 
 No party made this argument about Article 94, and, as far as I know, there is no 
support for it in international law (and Professor Vázquez himself notes that such an 
interpretation of Article 94 would almost certainly be wrong).141  Instead, what the U.S. 
138 128 S Ct at 1366. 
139 Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 660 (cited in note 7). 
140 See id at 662. 
141 The ICJ has since confirmed that the Avena decision is unconditionally binding on the United 
States as a matter of international law, a proposition that it noted that both the U.S. government and the 
U.S. Supreme Court accepted.  See Judgment, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 
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government had argued was that Article 94 constitutes “a commitment on the part of 
U.N. Members to take future action through their political branches to comply with an 
ICJ decision.”142  The Court quoted this language from the government’s brief, and then 
immediately stated, “We agree with this construction of Article 94.”143  Neither the Court 
nor the parties suggested that Article 94 gave the United States some discretion not to 
comply with Avena.  Indeed, the Court observed that, “No one disputes that the Avena
decision – a decision that flows from the treaties through which the United States 
submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to Vienna Convention disputes – constitutes an 
international law obligation on the part of the United States.”144  Instead of resisting or 
qualifying that proposition, the Court distinguished international obligations from the 
issue of self-execution, noting that “not all international law obligations automatically 
constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts.”145
 In support of his contrary reading of the decision, Professor Vázquez cites an 
observation by the Court that giving ICJ decisions immediate domestic effect would 
eliminate the “option of noncompliance” contemplated by the UN Charter’s placement of 
enforcement authority with the Security Council.  There is no suggestion in this 
observation, however, that the Court meant that the United States had the option under
international law of not complying with an ICJ decision to which it was a party.  Rather, 
the Court almost certainly meant that, given its veto power in the Council, the United 
States would as a practical matter have the ability to decide not to comply, and that the 
political branches were aware of that “option” when ratifying the relevant treaties.
Indeed, the Court specifically noted that “the President and Senate were undoubtedly 
aware in subscribing to the U.N. Charter and Optional Protocol, [that] the United States 
retained the unqualified right to exercise its veto of any Security Council resolution.”146
The Court further made clear that the “noncompliance” it was referring to was “through 
exercise of the Security Council veto – always regarded as an option by the Executive 
and ratifying Senate during and after consideration of the [relevant treaties].”147  By 
contrast, said the Court, direct enforcement of ICJ decisions by U.S. courts would 
“undermin[e] the ability of the political branches to determine whether and how to 
comply with an ICJ judgment.”148  In all these references, the Court is obviously 
referring to the political option of noncompliance, not one conferred as a matter of law
the trea
 by 
ty.
2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America), ¶¶  
28, 36, 44 (Jan. 19, 2009), at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14939.pdf?PHPSESSID= 
d3b5b436b441b101118fb70dbc03dfaf. 
142 128 S Ct at 1358. 
143 Id. 
144 Id at 1356. 
145 Id. 
146 Id at 1359. 
147 Id at 1360. 
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 Professor Vázquez contends that there is no way to explain the Court’s reliance 
on the phrase “undertakes to comply” in its self-execution analysis other than through his 
reading of the decision.149  In fact, as noted above, the Court (and Justice Stevens in his 
concurrence) understood that phrase as suggesting a future obligation to comply through 
political branch action.  The Court distinguished the phrase from more present-tense 
terms such as “shall” and “must,” and also noted that the phrase did not “indicate that the 
Senate that ratified the U. N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal 
effect in domestic courts.”150  Regardless of whether this happens to be the best reading 
of the phrase, the Court’s approach is similar to that taken in Foster and in a number of 
lower court decisions.151  Indeed, Professor Vázquez has himself noted in other writings 
that “[l]ater courts have interpreted Foster as establishing that ‘words of futurity’ indicate 
that a treaty provision is not self-executing.”152  Professor Vázquez argues that an intent-
of-the-parties approach to self-execution would not have shown that “undertakes to 
comply” was in fact language of futurity, but, as I explain below, the Court was probably 
not following the intent-of-the-parties approach. 
 Despite all of this, Medellín need not be read as going to the opposite end of the 
spectrum and requiring a presumption against self-execution.  Justice Breyer’s dissent 
accused the majority of adopting a clear statement requirement for self-execution, based 
on the Court’s comment in the presidential power portion of its decision that, “[i]f the 
Executive determines that a treaty should have domestic effect of its own force, that 
determination may be implemented ‘in mak[ing]’ the treaty, by ensuring that it contains 
language plainly providing for domestic enforceability.”153  But the Court denied the 
charge, emphasizing that no “talismanic words” are required for self-execution.154  The 
Court also made clear that self-execution should be determined on a treaty-by-treaty 
basis, stating, for example, that “under our established precedent, some treaties are self-
executing and some are not, depending on the treaty.”155  In addition, the Court observed 
that prior decisions that have found treaties to be self-executing “stand only for the 
unremarkable proposition that some international agreements are self-executing and 
others are not,”156 and it reserved judgment on whether the relevant provision of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is self-executing, even though that provision 
does not contain a clear statement of self-execution.157
149 Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 661-62 (cited in note 7). 
150 128 S Ct at 1358. 
151 See, e.g., Robertson v General Electric Co., 32 F2d 495, 500 (4th Cir 1929) (citing “language 
of futurity” as evidence of non-self-execution); Sei Fujii v California, 242 P2d 617, 622 (Cal. 1952) 
(finding UN Charter provisions to be non-self-executing because, among other things, they were “framed 
as a promise of future action by the member nations”). 
152 Vázquez, 89 Am J Intl L at 703 n.40 (cited in note 6). 
153 See 128 S Ct at 1369; id at 1380 (Breyer, J, dissenting). 
154 Id at 1366.  
155 Id at 1365. 
156 Id at 1364. 
157 See id at 1357 n.4. 
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 If the Court was suggesting any presumption in Medellín, it was probably just a 
presumption against giving direct effect to ICJ judgments.  It was after all the 
enforceability of ICJ judgments, rather than the status of treaty obligations in general, 
that was the precise question before the Court.  The Court recognized this, stating:  “The 
question we confront here is whether the Avena judgment has automatic domestic legal 
effect such that the judgment of its own force applies in state and federal courts.”158  The 
Court subsequently noted that, “[g]iven that ICJ judgments may interfere with state 
procedural rules, one would expect the ratifying parties to the relevant treaties to have 
clearly stated their intent to give those judgments domestic effect, if they had so 
intended.”159 A presumption against giving direct effect to ICJ judgments can easily be 
defended, however, without resort to any general presumption against treaty self-
execution.  ICJ judgments concern disputes between nations that will often be politically 
sensitive.  As a result, there are good reasons to think that the political branches would 
want flexibility in deciding how to implement these judgments after they are issued.  
Direct judicial enforcement of these judgments might even raise constitutional concerns 
in some cases, relating, for example, to the Article III authority of the federal courts, or to 
the role of the states in the U.S. federal system.160
 The Court’s decision in Medellín will probably mean, as the dissenters asserted, 
that ICJ judgments issued pursuant to other ICJ clauses in treaties will also be deemed to 
be non-self-executing in the United States.161  This issue will rarely arise, however, in 
view of the infrequency with which the ICJ issues judgments involving the United States. 
Moreover, few other nations (if any) give direct effect to ICJ judgments, so the United 
States will hardly be alone in failing to do so.162  Nor does Medellín entail a significant 
change in U.S. practice: U.S. courts have never given direct effect to an ICJ judgment, 
and, in fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held twenty 
years ago that such judgments were not enforceable in U.S. courts at the behest of private 
parties.163
 The one possible deviation in Medellín from my treatment of the Supremacy 
Clause is the suggestion by the Court, in a variety of statements, that non-self-executing 
158 Id at 1356; see also id at 1357 n. 4 (“The question is whether the Avena judgment has binding 
effect in domestic courts under the Optional Protocol, ICJ Statute, and U.N. Charter.”). 
159 Id at 1363-64. 
160 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 
Sup Ct Rev 59; Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-
Execution, 55 Stan L Rev 1557 (2003). 
161 128 S Ct at 1388 (Breyer, J, dissenting). 
162 See id at 1363 (observing that “neither Medellín nor his amici have identified a single nation 
that treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts”); see also A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts 
and American Courts, 21 Mich J Intl L 877, 886-87 (2000) (finding little support in other countries for 
giving ICJ decisions binding force in domestic courts). 
163 See Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v Reagan, 859 F2d 929, 937-38 (DC Cir 
1988). 
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treaties do not have any status as domestic law.164  My approach, by contrast, would 
distinguish between judicially enforceable treaty commitments and those that are not, 
while labeling all of them the supreme law of the land.  Among other things, I believe my 
approach is easier to reconcile with the text of the Supremacy Clause, which states that 
“all” treaties ratified by the United States shall be the supreme law of the land (and here 
Professor Vázquez and I are in agreement).165
 There is in any event some ambiguity in the opinion about whether the Court 
really meant to say that non-self-executing treaties were not part of the supreme law of 
the land.  The Court never actually phrases it that way, and, in an opinion otherwise 
highly focused on textual materials, it never seeks to explain how its statements about 
non-self-executing treaties accord with the text of the Supremacy Clause.166  In addition, 
in a number of places in the opinion the Court appears to equate the self-execution issue 
with judicial enforceability.167  The Court’s general test for self-execution also focuses on 
whether the treaty is a “directive to domestic courts,”168 not on whether the treaty is 
domestic law.  Moreover, a number of the Court’s references to lack of domestic law 
status were focused on the Avena judgment rather than on the underlying treaties.169
Even the Texas Solicitor General, who successfully argued the case for Texas, has made 
clear that he views non-self-executing treaties as part of the supreme law of the land, 
despite the fact that his brief used phrasing similar to that used by the Supreme Court.170
164 See, e.g., 128 S Ct at 1356 (“This Court has long recognized the distinction between treaties 
that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that – while they constitute international law 
commitments – do not by themselves function as binding federal law.”).  A number of the Court’s 
statements about domestic law concerned the distinct question of the status of ICJ judgments rather than the 
status of treaties.  See, e.g., id at 1357 (“[W]e conclude that the Avena judgment is not automatically 
binding domestic law.”).  These statements are much easier to reconcile with the text of the Supremacy 
Clause, since, unlike treaties, ICJ judgments are not listed in the Supremacy Clause as part of the supreme 
law of the land. 
165 See also Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, at 203-04 (cited in note 8) 
(“Whether [a treaty] is self-executing or not, it is supreme law of the land.”). 
166 For an effort to reconcile the proposition that non-self-executing treaties lack the status of 
domestic law with the Supremacy Clause, see the postings by Nick Rosenkranz in the Federalist Society 
Online Debate (cited in note 27). 
167 See, e.g., 128 S Ct at 1356 (“[N]ot all international law obligations automatically constitute 
binding federal law enforceable in United States courts.”) (emphasis added); id (“The question we confront 
here is whether the Avena judgment has automatic domestic legal effect such that the judgment of its own 
force applies in state and federal courts.”) (second emphasis added); id at 1361 (“The pertinent 
international agreements, therefore, do not provide for implementation of ICJ judgments through direct 
enforcement in domestic courts . . .”) (emphasis added). 
168 Id at 1358. 
169 See, e.g., id at 1357 (“[W]e conclude that the Avena judgment is not automatically binding 
domestic law.”); id at 1372 (“For the reasons we have stated, the Avena judgment is not domestic law.”).  
These statements are much easier to reconcile with the text of the Supremacy Clause, since, unlike treaties, 
ICJ judgments are not listed in the Supremacy Clause as part of the supreme law of the land. 
170 See Ted Cruz, Remarks, Federalist Society Online Debate (cited in note 27) (“Of course, all 
three treaties at issue (including Article 94 of the UN Charter) are ‘federal law,’ because all treaties are 
‘federal law.’  That wasn’t the question before the Court.  The question was whether the treaties were ‘self-
executing,’ by which the Court meant judicially enforceable in U.S. courts.”).  Cf. Brief for Respondent, 
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 The Court’s position on this issue continued to be ambiguous in a subsequent 
order by the Court denying Medellín a stay of execution.  In declining to issue the stay, 
the Court stated that “[i]t is up to Congress whether to implement obligations undertaken 
under a treaty which (like this one) does not itself have the force and effect of domestic 
law sufficient to set aside the judgment or the ensuing sentence.”171  The italicized 
language would appear to be superfluous if the Court believes that non-self-executing 
treaties lack any domestic law status.  For what it is worth, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee has expressed the view after Medellín that non-self-executing treaties are part 
of the supreme law of the land.172
While not particularly material to the analysis in this Article, the issue of whether 
non-self-executing treaties have some domestic law status might matter in some contexts.  
It might matter, for example, in debates within the Executive Branch over whether the 
President is obligated to comply with a non-self-executing treaty.173  It might also affect 
the Executive Branch’s ability to take action voluntarily to enforce a non-self-executing 
treaty.174  In Medellín, the Court reasoned that “the non-self-executing character of a 
treaty constrains the President’s ability to comply with treaty commitments by 
unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts.”175  At the same time, the 
Court disavowed any suggestion that a non-self-executing treaty, without implementing 
legislation, “preclude[d] the President from acting to comply with an international treaty 
obligation,” and indicated that “[t]he President may comply with the treaty’s obligations 
by some other means, so long as they are consistent with the Constitution.”176   The 
distinction between lack of judicial enforceability and lack of domestic law status also 
mattered to Justice Stevens’ concurrence:  because Justice Stevens regarded the treaty 
obligation in question to be part of the supreme law of the land, even though not self-
executing, he suggested (somewhat cryptically, to be sure) that the states had an 
Medellín v. Texas, at 14 (No. 06-984) (“[U]nless the treaty reflects an agreement between the President and 
the Senate to create domestic law, no such law is made.”). 
171 Medellín v Texas, 129 S Ct 360, 361 (2008). 
172 See, e.g., Exec Rept 110-12, 110th Cong, 2d Sess, Extradition Treaties with the European 
Union (Sept 11, 2008), at 10 (“In accordance with the Constitution, all treaties – whether self-executing or 
not – are the supreme law of the land, and the President shall take care that they be faithfully executed.”), at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&docid=f:er012.110.pdf. 
173 Cf. Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 
Cornell L Rev 97, 158 (2004) (arguing that “the President’s duty under the Take Care Clause includes a 
duty to execute treaties that are the law of the land”).  The Take Care Clause of the Constitution provides 
that the President is obligated to take care that the “Laws” are faithfully executed.  The government did not 
rely on that Clause as a source of authority in Medellín, and the Court briefly dismissed the Clause’s 
relevance at the end of its opinion, on the ground that the Clause “allows the President to execute the laws, 
not make them,” and that “the Avena judgment is not domestic law.”  128 S Ct at 1372.  The Court did not 
say there that non-self-executing treaties do not constitute “Laws” for purposes of the Take Care Clause. 
174 See generally Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 Colum L Rev 331 (2008). 
175 128 S Ct at 1371. 
176 Id. 
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obligation to comply with it, even though they would not be forced to do so by the federal 
courts.177
Relevant Intent
 The Medellín decision is also generally consistent with my second claim, which is 
that the relevant intent for self-execution is that of the U.S. treatymakers.  The Court 
stated that “[o]ur cases simply require courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a 
determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the 
treaty has domestic effect.”178  The Court also noted that “we have held treaties to be 
self-executing when the textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate
intended for the agreement to have domestic effect.”179  And, in summarizing its finding
of non-self-execution, the Court explained that “[n]othing in the text, background, 
negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that th
President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an 
international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by ‘many of our most fundam
constitutional protections.’”
e
ental 
greements will be enforced.”
ich
 of 
hile (properly) expressing some doubt about whether such views 
ould be relevant.184
180  The Court’s rejection of the dissent’s proposed 
multifactor approach to self-execution was also premised on an intent-of-the-U.S. 
approach.  The Court stated:  “The dissent’s contrary approach would assign to the courts 
– not the political branches – the primary role in deciding when and how international 
181a
 There are, to be fair, a few indications in the opinion going the other way, wh
may suggest some confusion on the Court about the issue.  The Court began its self-
execution analysis by referring to Supreme Court decisions that have looked to the intent 
of the parties in interpreting substantive treaty terms.182  It also asserted that its finding
non-self-execution was confirmed by the postratification understandings of the treaty 
parties, something that would not be particularly relevant under an intent-of-the-U.S. 
approach.183  The Court even considered in a footnote whether the ICJ had views on the 
self-execution issue, w
w
 On balance, though, the Court’s decision is best interpreted as endorsing an 
intent-of-the-U.S. approach.  In addition to the many direct statements to this effect 
177 See id at 1374 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
178 128 S Ct at 1366 (emphasis added). 
179 Id at 1364 (emphasis added). 
180 Id at 1367 (emphasis added) (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 126 S Ct 2669, 2687 (2006)). 
181 Id at 1363; see also id at 1360 (observing that “there is no reason to believe that the President 
and Senate signed up” for giving direct effect to ICJ decisions).  
182 See id at 1357-58. 
183 See id at 1363. 
184 See id at 1361 n.9. 
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quoted above, the Court relied on the U.S. ratification history for the UN Charter rather 
than on the collective negotiating history.  More generally, the Court did not attempt to
ascertain how the relevant treaty language, such as “undertakes to comply,” would be 
understood by other treaty parties.  Furthermore, in the presidential power portion of its
decision, the Court expressed the view that if the Executive Branch could make a non-
self-executing treaty binding on domestic courts, it would be acting “in conflict with t
implicit understanding of the ratifying Senate.”
he
 that the 
ourt focused here and elsewhere on the Senate’s and the President’s intent. 
rences in 
in Part 
ent and 
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n intent-of-the parties approach 
 self-execution would end up constituting a snark hunt. 
c
cerning
185  That assertion may or may not be 
persuasive with respect to the treaties at issue in Medellín, but the key point is
C
 Professor Vázquez claims that, despite the overwhelming number of refe
the opinion to senatorial and presidential intent, the Court could not have been 
considering that intent because it paid close attention to the treaty text.  Such text, 
Professor Vázquez asserts, “reflects the intent of the parties, not the unilateral views of 
the U.S. treatymakers.”186   Professor Vázquez fails to recognize that, as discussed 
III, the text could be relevant to both inquiries.  Treaty text is of course relevant in 
ascertaining the collective intent of the parties, but it is also relevant in ascertaining the
unilateral intent of the U.S. treatymakers, which is the only intent there is likely to be 
with respect to the issue of self-execution.  Thus, as the Court explained, “we have held 
treaties to be self-executing when the textual provisions indicate that the Presid
Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic effect.”187  The Court also 
specifically defended its emphasis on treaty text by noting:  “That is after all what the 
Senate looks to in deciding whether to approve the treaty.”188  Like Professor Vázqu
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Medellín misses this point.  Justice Breyer contends that 
looking at the treaty text for evidence concerning self-execution is, at best, “hunting the 
snark,” because it is unlikely that the parties will have reached an agreement on the issue 
that would be incorporated into the text.189  In fact, only a
to
 To be sure, absent a specific declaration by the Senate, it is not clear that text by 
itself will provide sufficient evidence of the U.S. treatymakers’ intent concerning whether 
a particular treaty provision is self-executing.  If not, the Court may have been unrealisti
in thinking that it could avoid the indeterminacy and judicial discretion associated with 
the dissent’s proposed approach.  Despite its criticism of the dissent, however, it is not 
clear that the Court was insisting that text is the only relevant consideration in dis
such intent.  Indeed, as noted above, the Court looked to statements made in the 
ratification history to aid its understanding of this intent.190  The subject matter of the 
185 Id at 1369. 
186 Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 659 (cited in note 7). 
187 128 S Ct at 1364 (emphasis added). 
188 Id at 1362 (emphasis added). 
189 Id at 1381 (Breyer, J, dissenting).  See also Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 629, 636-37 (cited in 
note 7) (endorsing Justice Breyer’s “snark” comment).
190 See text accompanying note 126. 
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treaties in question – international dispute resolution between nations – also appears to 
have been relevant to the Court’s assessment of likely intent.191  The Court even invoked 
functional considerations to support its analysis.192  In rejecting the multifactor ap
proposed in dissent by Justice Breyer, the Court appears principally to have been 
objecting to the idea that a treaty provision could be self-executing in some cases but not
in others.  A contextual approach could be applied, however, in a more categorical way, 
such that a treaty pro
proach 
vision would be either self-executing or not in all cases, avoiding the 
ourt’s concern.193
tion
ce
rast,
cuting
was operating within 
e lowest category of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework.197
tatutes and Treaties 
C
 It is true, as Professor Vázquez points out,194 that the presidential power por
of the Court’s decision reflects a formalistic conception of lawmaking.  The Court 
reasoned there that “the terms of a non-self-executing treaty can become domestic law 
only in the same way as any other law – through passage of legislation by both Houses of 
Congress, combined with either the President’s signature or a congressional override of a
Presidential veto.”195  One might infer from that discussion, as Professor Vázquez does, 
that the Court would resist the idea that the U.S. treatymakers have an adjunct or lesser-
included lawmaking power over self-execution.  But this inference is far from clear, sin
the exercise such a power still requires the use of the treaty process, that is, two-thirds 
Senate consent and presidential approval.  The Court’s concern in Medellín, by cont
was with unilateral presidential control over the issue, especially when that control 
contradicted a decision made earlier by the U.S. treatymakers.  The Court noted, for 
example, that “[w]hen the President asserts the power to ‘enforce’ a non-self-exe
treaty by unilaterally creating domestic law, he acts in conflict with the implicit 
understanding of the ratifying Senate.”196  Moreover, the Court’s presidential power 
analysis actually appears to assume that the U.S. treatymakers have exercised some 
domestic lawmaking power when deciding that a treaty shall not be self-executing, since 
this was the basis on which the Court concluded that President Bush 
th
S
191 See text accompanying note 128. 
192 See text accompanying note 129. 
193 Cf. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v Empagran S.A., 542 US 155, 168-69 (2004) (rejecting case-
by-case approach to determining whether comity factors supported the application of U.S. antitrust law to 
independent foreign injury in favor of categorical approach). 
194 See Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 659 (cited in note 7). 
195 128 S Ct at 1369. 
196 Id. 
197 See id at 1369 (“[T]he non-self-executing character of the relevant treaties not only refutes the 
notion that the ratifying parties vested the President with the authority to unilaterally make treaty 
obligations binding on domestic courts, but also implicitly prohibits him from doing so.”).  I am merely 
describing the Court’s reasoning here, not endorsing it.  The fact that the U.S. treatymakers did not intend 
for ICJ decisions to be directly enforceable in U.S. courts would not necessarily mean that they wanted to 
preclude the President from implementing such decisions if he or she chose to do so. 
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Consistent with my third claim, the Court also took account of the distinct nature 
of treaties in its self-execution analysis.  Quoting the Head Money Cases, the Court noted 
at the outset that a treaty is “‘primarily a compact between independent nations” that 
ordinarily “depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of 
the governments which are parties to it.’”198  While the Court of course recognized that 
some treaties are also domestically enforceable in U.S. courts, this is only true, said the 
Court, “when the textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for 
the agreement to have domestic effect.”199
 In finding that there was no such self-executing intent, the Court took account of 
the treaty context.  Among other things, the Court observed that the requirement of 
compliance with ICJ decisions was situated within an international legal system that 
emphasized political rather than judicial enforcement – in particular, enforcement 
through the Security Council, where the United States holds a veto.  The Court also 
expressed concern about transferring “sensitive foreign policy decisions” to the state and 
federal courts, given that “‘[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is 
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative – ‘the political’ – 
Departments.’”200
The Court also observed in a footnote that even when treaties are self-executing, 
“the background presumption is that ‘[i]nternational agreements, even those directly 
benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private 
cause of action in domestic courts.’”201  For this proposition, the Court quoted from the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, which appears to be making an empirical claim 
about the nature of treaties. Professor Vázquez dismisses the Restatement’s observation 
on the ground that “the Supremacy Clause generally makes treaties enforceable in our 
courts in the same circumstances as statutory and constitutional provisions of like 
content,”202 but, for reasons already discussed, that is an overly broad reading of the 
Clause.
 The Court’s institutional process concerns associated with giving direct effect to 
ICJ judgments were also related specifically to the international context of the case.  As 
noted above, the Court stated that the consequences of the argument that ICJ decisions 
have direct effect in the U.S. legal system “give pause,” because the argument would 
mean that an ICJ judgment “is not only binding domestic law but is also unassailable” 
such that even erroneous ICJ rulings would override state and possibly even federal law.
While it is common for domestic courts to exercise this sort of authority, the Court was 
obviously troubled by the idea that such authority had been delegated to actors outside of 
198 Id at 1357. 
199 Id at 1364. 
200 Id at 1360 (quoting Oetjen v Central Leather Co., 246 US 297, 302 (1918)). 
201 Id at 1357 n.3 (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
§ 907, cmt. a (cited in note 14)). 
202 Vázquez, 122 Harv L Rev at 627 n.131 (cited in note 7). 
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the U.S. legal system.  In this respect, the decision was foreshadowed by the Court’s 
earlier decision in Sanchez-Llamas, in which the Court resisted the idea that U.S. federal 
courts should be bound by the ICJ’s interpretation of a treaty.203  These concerns, which 
relate to democratic process and sovereignty, are not typically implicated by domestic 
statutes. 
 Finally, the Court’s discussion of the “option of noncompliance” demonstrated its 
recognition of the dual law-and-politics nature of treaty commitments.  The Court was 
not advocating the breach of U.S. treaty obligations, but it was recognizing that decisions 
about whether and how to comply with such obligations are not purely legal decisions but 
also involve questions of international politics.  As discussed above, the duality of 
treaties suggests that the role of the courts in enforcing them may be somewhat more 
limited than with respect to statutes, especially when such enforcement poses a risk of 
undermining political branch management of foreign relations, a proposition evident at 
least since Foster.  The longstanding doctrine of deference to Executive Branch treaty 
constructions, invoked by the Court in Medellín, also takes account of this proposition. 
CONCLUSION
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín is unlikely to result in a significant 
change in the extent of U.S. judicial enforcement of treaties, but it may make it less likely 
that certain academic claims about such enforcement will be achieved.  As the Court 
appears to have recognized, treaties have a dual nature in that they are situated in the 
domain of international politics as well as in the domain of law, and this duality is 
relevant to their judicial enforceability.  Their dual nature means that their domestic 
judicial enforceability is in part a political decision, not some automatic rule of the 
Supremacy Clause.  The relevant intent in discerning whether treaties are subject to such 
domestic judicial enforceability is in turn the intent of the national political branches.
Finally, the international political dimension of treaties means that, as a class, they are 
less likely than statutes to be subject to domestic judicial enforcement, especially in the 
modern era.
 Although judicial practice may not change substantially after Medellín, we are 
likely to see increased use by the Senate of declarations of self-execution and non-self-
execution.  Assuming such declarations are valid, as this Article has maintained, the 
Senate practice should simplify the issue of self-execution over time.  The widespread 
and continuing use of congressional-executive agreements may have a similar effect.  In 
other situations it may be appropriate to give deference to the current views of the 
Executive Branch about the treaty’s domestic enforceability.  There will of course 
203 See Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 126 S Ct 2669, 2684 (2006) (“If treaties are to be given effect 
as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law ‘is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department,’ headed by the ‘one supreme Court’ established by the 
Constitution.”) (quoting Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).  The Court in Medellín 
made clear, however, that it was “not suggest[ing] that treaties can never afford binding domestic effect to 
international tribunal judgments.”  128 S Ct at 1364-65. 
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continue to be circumstances in which there will be no clear guidance from the political 
branches, and in those cases courts are likely to make contextual judgments that take 
account of the text, structure, and subject matter of the treaty, lines of precedent and other 
historical practice, the congressional backdrop, and the functional consequences of direct 
judicial enforceability.  The doctrine of treaty self-execution thus entails a degree of 
judicial discretion, but it is a type of discretion that is ultimately subject to political 
branch control. 
